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ARTICLES
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY GAME:
STRATEGIC JUDGING AND THE
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL*
This Article uses recent developments in the enforcement of arbitration agreements
to illustrate one way in which strategic dynamics can drive doctrinal change. In a
fairly short period of time, arbitration has grown from a method of resolving disputes between sophisticated business entities into a phenomenon that pervades the
contemporary economy. The United States Supreme Court has encouraged this
transformation through expansive interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act.
But not all courts have embraced arbitration so fervently, and therefore case law in
this area is marked by tension and conflict. The thesis of this Article is that we can
better understand developments in arbitration doctrine by viewing the case law as
the product of an ongoing strategic interaction between courts with differing preferences regarding the spread of arbitration. As the Supreme Court has shut off most
other means of resisting arbitration, the state law doctrine of unconscionability has
in the last several years become a surprisingly attractive and successful tool for
striking down arbitration agreements. The nature of unconscionability analysis is
that it is flexible, which provides opportunities for courts skeptical of arbitration to
use the doctrine to evade the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration directives while
simultaneously insulating their rulings from Supreme Court review. Sophisticated
resistance to arbitration is just one side of the story, however. The approach
employed in this Article examines the judicial system as a whole, including the ways
pro-arbitration courts respond, sometimes indirectly, to what they perceive as
manipulation of unconscionability. The suspicion that some courts are disfavoring
arbitration drives pro-arbitration courts to change their strategies, such as by establishing new doctrine that facilitates monitoring and shifts decisionmaking authority.
This strategic framework can help us make sense of otherwise puzzling trends in
arbitration doctrine and can help us predict what moves will be next. Although the
specific subject matter is arbitration, this analysis is also aimed at those interested in
more general problems of judicial federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Some observers have conceived of the relationship between the
federal courts and the state courts as a dialogue, an interchange of
ideas between two systems with distinct sets of values, competencies,
and needs.1 But we can also profitably think of the relationship not as
a conversation but as a game. This Article presents a case study in the
game of judicial federalism: the “unconscionability game.” The state
and federal courts are the players. Their field is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the federal statute that makes agreements to arbitrate future disputes generally enforceable.2 This game provides
insights into ongoing developments in FAA jurisprudence and, more
broadly, into the problem of how and why certain doctrine changes.
The unconscionability game is a game in the sense that it involves
the interaction of various institutional players, each with its own
policy preferences. The United States Supreme Court strongly favors
1 E.g., Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046–52 (1977).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). The key provisions of the FAA are discussed in Part I.A,
infra.
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arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. It has interpreted the
FAA expansively, nullifying most of the state laws and public policies
that formerly excluded many types of transactions, such as consumer
and employment transactions, from arbitration. With the Court’s
encouragement, arbitration is changing from a method of resolving
disputes between commercial parties into a phenomenon that permeates the contemporary economy. Some lower courts (mostly certain
state courts, but also a few federal courts) view arbitration with more
skepticism, especially in cases involving consumers or employees who
have signed nonnegotiated arbitration agreements embedded in
standard-form contracts. As in any situation where the preferences of
the reviewing court and the lower courts diverge, there is the potential
for strategic behavior. Each player seeks to advance its own aims
through the tools at its disposal, keeping in mind the other’s anticipated responses.
Because the Supreme Court has embraced arbitration much more
firmly than have some other parts of the judicial system, there is a sort
of hydraulic pressure in the system that will seek release through
whatever channel still exists for invalidating, or at least limiting, arbitration agreements. The main channel that remains open to courts
skeptical of the increasingly pervasive use of arbitration is a provision
of the FAA that allows a court to invalidate an arbitration agreement
under generally applicable state contract principles, such as unconscionability, that would render any contract unenforceable.3 That is,
federal law allows a court to hold an arbitration agreement unconscionable as a matter of state contract law, but only if the court is
employing, evenhandedly, the same unconscionability analysis it
applies to other contracts.4 Yet it is extremely difficult for a reviewing
court to tell if a decision invalidating an arbitration agreement on
unconscionability grounds obeys that rule. This difficulty creates
opportunities for lower courts to misapply, or perhaps even manipulate, state contract doctrines so as to nullify arbitration agreements
while simultaneously frustrating the ability of reviewing courts to
reverse.
Although this Article takes the FAA as its specific subject matter,
it implicates broader themes of federal courts law. It has become
commonplace to observe that the law of federal courts contains two
fundamental but inconsistent rhetorical and doctrinal traditions: a
nationalist view that privileges federal authority and the federal judi3 Id. § 2 (making arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
4 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); see infra notes 66–83 and accompanying text (discussing role of state contract defenses).
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ciary on the one hand versus a federalist (i.e., pro-state) view that
gives primacy to state powers and state courts on the other.5 Those
two strands of thought are associated with competing positions on the
question of parity—the shorthand for the long-running debate over
whether the state courts are just as good as the federal courts in
enforcing federal rights and duties.6 Traditionally, the clash over
parity has been most conspicuous in politically charged fields like
habeas corpus and civil rights litigation.7 Certainly, questions of
parity retain vitality there, but today the real front line may instead be
civil litigation that pits consumers, tort claimants, employees, and
other individuals against business interests. Echoing the complaints of
civil rights litigants and criminal defendants a generation ago, corporate defendants now take the lead in arguing that the state courts are
deficient. This dissatisfaction with state courts has manifested itself
through, among other things, federal legislation such as the Class
Action Fairness Act,8 judicial endorsements of broad readings of federal jurisdiction,9 Supreme Court review of state courts’ punitive damages awards,10 and, as we explore here, tensions over the scope of the
FAA.
Indeed, the FAA provides a particularly fertile ground for the
study of judicial federalism because the FAA provision at issue here—
which imposes a federal duty of evenhandedness on state law rul5 E.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605, 606–07 (1981); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal
Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1142–45 (1988).
6 The parity debate has generated a large literature. A small sampling includes
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1999), Bator, supra note 5, and Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
7 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (citing parity as justification
for restricting availability of habeas relief); Neuborne, supra note 6 (discussing parity in
context of federal constitutional claims).
8 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)) (expanding federal jurisdiction over interstate class
actions); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2) (2006) (providing for removal of certain
securities fraud cases).
9 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)
(announcing broad interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction statute); Aetna Health, Inc.
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (holding state claims against HMO completely preempted by
ERISA and thus subject to removal to federal court). For recent commentary on the general trend toward more expansive federal court jurisdiction, see Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1398–1414
(2006), and Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction after Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553 (2007).
10 See Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2045, 2074–84 (2008) (describing recent Supreme Court activity in this area as reflection of
distrust of state courts).
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ings—implicates a thorny problem in state-federal judicial relations:
We treat state courts as supreme and unreviewable on matters of state
law, and yet we also understand that a misapplication (or distortion)
of state law can in some cases defeat federal rights. This tension provides the animating force behind storied cases like Fairfax’s Devisee v.
Hunter’s Lessee, the “inadequate state ground” decisions of the civil
rights era, and, most recently, the controversial Bush v. Gore concurrence.11 In each case, the federal courts were faced with rulings that
arguably manipulated state law and that called for the extraordinary
response of questioning the bona fides of the state ruling. The FAA
creates a similar dynamic by requiring the federal courts to police the
honesty of state law rulings in what has become a highly contentious
area of the law. A vexing but usually rare problem in federal courts
law thus finds itself uncomfortably spotlighted at center stage in the
liability reform debate.
This Article is meant to be primarily positive and explanatory
rather than normative. The purpose is not to criticize how lower
courts are applying current FAA doctrine nor to pass judgment upon
the Supreme Court decisions that have created that doctrine. Nor
does it aim to add to the heated policy debate over whether the
expansion of arbitration is a positive development.12 The point is
instead to develop an analytical framework, building on certain
insights from positive political theory, that can advance our understanding of where arbitration doctrine is and where it might be going.
A key virtue of this approach is that it allows us to examine, with
some perspective, the judicial system as a whole, including how proarbitration courts have begun reacting to burgeoning applications of
unconscionability and related doctrines. We thus can see that the
recent rise in the use of unconscionability to strike down arbitration
agreements, recognized in the existing scholarly literature,13 represents only one part of the story—one of the latest moves but certainly
not the last. The system is not static but reactive.
The strategic perspective also helps us make sense of some otherwise puzzling recent developments. It may explain, for example, why
the Supreme Court—never shy about enforcing its pro-arbitration
preferences—has been surprisingly hesitant to police certain areas of
FAA compliance directly. It may also explain why the Supreme Court
and some lower federal courts have taken the bizarre step of federalizing various issues that would otherwise obviously be questions of
11

See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
Cf. sources cited infra notes 37, 59 (citing commentary on whether current FAA
jurisprudence is correct as interpretive matter and desirable as policy matter).
13 See infra note 88 (citing scholarly commentary).
12
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state law. In both cases my proposed explanation is that the Supreme
Court finds itself in the difficult position of having provoked an explosion of decisions that it disfavors but that are difficult to review head
on—and thus it needs to fashion a new, less pliable doctrine in order
to improve monitoring and reduce the opportunity for evasion. Perceived manipulation of current doctrine demands new doctrine.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage for the later
analysis by briefly explaining the Supreme Court’s transformation of
the FAA and describing the tensions the Court’s strongly proarbitration directives have created. Part II then introduces a conceptual framework that builds on recent strategic instruments models of
judicial behavior, under which lower courts can manipulate the choice
of decision instruments so as to insulate their rulings from reversal by
ideologically adverse reviewing courts.14 The framework contributes
to the existing strategic instruments literature by considering expressive costs of review as well as technical costs of review. Part III then
examines the responsive strategies at the disposal of pro-arbitration
courts. In particular, it scrutinizes the development of new rules
about the allocation of judicial authority—rules that shift decisionmaking power between state and federal courts and between courts
and arbitrators. These emerging doctrinal changes reflect not just
legal considerations, nor just the Supreme Court’s preferences, but
rather respond to the ongoing problem of monitoring lower courts.
I
THE CONDITIONS THAT GENERATE
UNCONSCIONABILITY GAME

THE

The unconscionability game results from the tension between
strongly pro-arbitration courts, especially the United States Supreme
Court, and courts that are more leery of arbitration, mostly some state
courts. The Supreme Court has heightened these tensions by rapidly
expanding the scope and force of the Federal Arbitration Act to bring
it into conflict with important state policies. As the Court has shut off
various means of resisting arbitration, unconscionability has become
an increasingly attractive tool for striking down arbitration
agreements.
This Part is intended to provide a context for understanding the
conditions that generate strategic maneuvering between courts with
divergent views about arbitration. This will necessarily require
14 E.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24
(2007); see also infra Part II.A (describing this approach).

1426

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1420

making some generalizations about which courts hold particular
views—and indeed some generalizations are warranted—but it would
be incorrect to think that all state courts have resisted the spread of
arbitration or that all federal courts share the Supreme Court’s fervor.
There is diversity within each group as well as between them. Further,
positions on arbitration are not fixed, even over the fairly short term:
Perhaps the courts in a certain state used to be skeptical of arbitration,
but after a change in personnel brought by an election, they might
take a different view. With those caveats in mind, let us proceed by
first examining the Supreme Court’s role in setting the game in
motion.
A. The Supreme Court’s Transformation of the FAA
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to bolster the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes.15 Its key provision, section 2,
states:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.16

In other words, an arbitration agreement involving commerce—
whether a freestanding agreement or a clause within a larger contract—stands on equal footing with other agreements. Like all contracts, it is susceptible to familiar defenses such as fraud, duress, or
lack of consideration (i.e., “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract”), but it cannot be invalidated merely
because it is an agreement to settle a dispute outside the judicial
system.
The short passage quoted above holds within it the seeds of several major interpretive debates. Is the FAA merely a procedural rule
operative only in federal courts or instead a substantive national
policy that state courts must apply to the exclusion of their own law?
15 There has developed a standard lore that, before the enactment of the FAA, courts
were hostile to arbitration. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
24 (1991) (referring to “the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that
had existed at English common law and [that was] adopted by American courts”). In fact,
the history may be more complicated. Most courts refused to enforce predispute arbitration agreements through specific performance, for example, but courts were quite hospitable to private dispute resolution in other ways. For discussions of the pre-FAA history,
see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 15–24 (1992), and Michael H. Leroy
& Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the
Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 259–77 (2003).
16 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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To which types of contracts does it extend (or, in other words, what is
a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce”)? And
what types of causes of action can be sent to arbitration—only
common law actions or statutory claims as well?
These and related questions have spawned a large and stillgrowing literature.17 For our purposes, the interesting issue is not
what constitutes the “correct” interpretation of the statute. Rather,
the important point is that each of the interpretive questions was initially answered in a way that gave the statute a narrow scope and
cabined its potential to generate conflict, but these same questions are
now answered in ways that seem inevitably to lead to friction and,
perhaps, to evasion.
To begin, for many years the FAA was generally thought not to
apply in state courts.18 Indeed, as late as 1967 the Supreme Court had
not even definitively established that the FAA applied in federal
courts in diversity cases to override state policies.19 To be sure, during
the course of the twentieth century most states adopted their own statutes or judicial policies recognizing or bolstering the enforceability of
arbitration agreements, but these state policies were often less
favorable to arbitration than was the FAA.20
Moreover, even in a court in which it applied, the FAA was initially limited in scope to a fairly confined set of transactions. As we
have seen, the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration provisions in
a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”21 The section defining “commerce” states that it means interstate or international commerce.22 To a modern reader, this definition may evoke the
17 See generally MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 92–155 (discussing scope of FAA and court
interpretations of it); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (same); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5 (same). Other sources are cited in the course of the
discussion below.
18 See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 127–30 (discussing near absence of state cases concerning FAA in first thirty-four years after enactment).
19 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–05 (1967)
(concluding that FAA is exercise of congressional commerce power and governs in diversity suits). It should be noted that part of the difficulty in fixing the proper application of
the FAA stems from the fact that it was enacted in 1925, well before Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), meaning that the statute comes from a period of very different expectations regarding the division between state and federal law.
20 See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 15–80 (discussing state arbitration laws); see also,
e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1956) (applying Vermont
arbitration law, which permitted party to revoke agreement to arbitrate at any time prior
to announcement of award).
21 9 U.S.C. § 2.
22 Id. § 1.
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vast sweep of current Commerce Clause power, which reaches almost
all economic activity. But at the time of the FAA’s enactment, in
1925, the scope of federal regulatory power was, of course, much narrower.23 And although federal authority substantially expanded
through the course of the New Deal and then World War II,24 the
Supreme Court did not expand the scope of the FAA to match the full
reach of that expanded constitutional power.25 Moreover, the FAA’s
definition of “commerce” expressly excluded (at least certain types of)
employment contracts that would otherwise fall within the statute,
which further tended to restrict the statute’s reach.26
Finally, the FAA was limited in the types of causes of action to
which it applied. The Supreme Court held in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan
that actions under the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitrable, concluding that arbitration was contrary to the language and intent of the
statute.27 Later decisions applied that holding to various other statutory schemes.28
As a result of all the above limitations—of forums in which the
statute applied, of the types of transactions subject to regulation, and
of the kinds of claims that were arbitrable—the FAA’s reach was for
decades quite restrained. Arbitration under the FAA was during this
time largely a tool for resolving commercial disputes between busi23 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) (holding that Commerce Clause did not authorize federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of
goods made by child labor). In the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court struck down several
early New Deal initiatives as exceeding the scope of the commerce power. E.g., Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297–310 (1936) (Coal Conservation Act); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542–51 (1935) (Live Poultry Code promulgated under National Industrial Recovery Act); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330, 344, 370–74 (1935) (Railroad Retirement Act).
24 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (permitting Congress to
regulate farming for local consumption because of aggregate impact on national prices);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (repudiating Hammer, 247 U.S. 251).
For discussions of the growth of national regulatory power in this period, see generally
Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine
from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992), and Robert L. Stern,
The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645
(1946).
25 In the 1956 case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, for
instance, the Court quickly and easily dismissed the idea that an employment contract
between a Vermont citizen and a New York corporation was a contract “evidencing a
transaction involving commerce” for purposes of the FAA. Id. at 199–201.
26 9 U.S.C. § 1; see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259 (discussing employment exception).
27 346 U.S. 427, 437–38 (1953).
28 E.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826–28 (2d Cir.
1968) (Sherman Act); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp.
271 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (ERISA).
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nesspeople, not a phenomenon that pervaded virtually every corner of
the daily economy.29
That constrained, somewhat timid FAA is no more. With the
Supreme Court’s encouragement, it has grown into the broadly
sweeping, muscular statute we know today. The metamorphosis was
not instantaneous, but it is fair to say that the major stages of growth
occurred in the 1980s.30 The causes for this change are uncertain.
Likely playing a role was the Court’s view that litigation had become
excessive and needed to be curtailed. In 1976, Chief Justice Burger
promoted and spoke at the Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, the chief message of which was that the “litigation explosion would have to be
controlled.”31 The Pound Conference took place against a background of the business community’s growing dissatisfaction with the
legal system.32 Yet enthusiasm for arbitration can hardly be attributed
only to conservative Justices who let pro-business views overcome
their professed solicitude for federalism; early rulings strengthening
the FAA found support from left-leaning nationalist Justices as well.33
29 Carrington & Haagen, supra note 17, at 339–45. Arbitration was of course also a
common feature of union-management relations; arbitration in the collective bargaining
context is not a product of the FAA but instead of federal labor law. 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET
AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 11.3 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
30 Signs of the coming transformation were apparent in the 1960s and 1970s. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 757, 773–75 (2004) (discussing gradual growth of FAA in this period); Jean
R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 653–60 (1996) (same). Some lower courts in
the late 1950s and 1960s began to believe that the FAA applied in state courts, thus anticipating the Supreme Court’s conclusion. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 286 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing earlier lower-court decisions);
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 137–38 (same).
31 Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1993); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 310–16 (1996) (discussing
Burger’s role in Pound Conference). The lectures presented at the conference are collected in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
32 See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 291–99 (2002) (describing rise of pro-business “too much law”
critique in 1970s).
33 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (Brennan, J.) (announcing “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”). As Andrew
Siegel argues, the Rehnquist Court was characterized by hostility to litigation, a sentiment
that manifested itself (among other ways) through a pro-arbitration jurisprudence
embraced to varying degrees by most members of the Court. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court
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Chief Justice Burger would soon become the author of the important 1984 decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, in which the Court
held that the FAA is preemptive federal substantive law that applies
in both state and federal courts to the exclusion of any conflicting
state law.34 The Court therefore invalidated the California Franchise
Investment Law, which the California Supreme Court had interpreted
as barring arbitration of franchise disputes.35 Several Justices dissented,36 and the decision has remained the object of sustained criticism.37 Nonetheless, it has since been reaffirmed and extended
several times.38
Also overrun was the restrictive reading of “contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce” to mean only commerce
that was foreign or interstate in a narrow sense (as opposed to the
broad sense of those terms represented by modern constitutional doctrine). Under the old regime, states with arbitration-restricting policies could decline to apply the FAA to local transactions. Alabama
was one such state, and its courts routinely applied a state statute
invalidating predispute arbitration clauses, reasoning that the FAA
applied only to transactions in which the parties actively contemplated
substantial interstate activity.39 In the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a case involving a pest-control contract between
an Alabama homeowner and a local Terminix franchisee.40 Rejecting
the state court’s narrow reading of the FAA, the Supreme Court held
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1139–43 (2006).
34 465 U.S. 1, 10–17 (1984). The Court relied in part on its dictum in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital that the FAA was “federal substantive” law applicable in all courts.
460 U.S. at 25 n.32. Yet while the FAA is substantive law, it is unusual in that it does not
create federal jurisdiction. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006) (giving district courts authority
to issue stays of litigation and orders compelling arbitration in cases within district courts’
preexisting jurisdiction). If an arbitration clause were an automatic ticket to federal court,
that would of course eliminate much of the opportunity for state court noncompliance
discussed in this Article. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing potential developments in this
area).
35 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10–17.
36 Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 21 (O’Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37 E.g., MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 103–21, 139–47; Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Act Never Enacted by
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 125–31 (2006). Needless to say, I do not purport to
resolve the debate here.
38 E.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 983 n.2 (2008) (refusing invitation to overrule
Southland); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (same).
39 E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1993); see also
Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603–04 (Minn. 1982) (holding that FAA
did not reach edge of Commerce Clause and therefore applying state arbitration law).
40 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 268.
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that the FAA applied to the full reach of the modern Commerce
Clause power.41 And that is, of course, a broad reach indeed; it easily
encompassed the pest-control contract because some of the treatment
and repair materials moved in interstate commerce and because
Terminix (though not its local franchise) is a multistate business.42
When the Alabama Supreme Court later fashioned another narrow
reading of the FAA’s scope, the Supreme Court summarily reversed
the state court and reiterated that the FAA applies broadly to economic activity that affects interstate commerce in the aggregate,
whether or not the particular contract at issue itself substantially
affects interstate commerce.43
There at least remained the fact that section 1 of the FAA
excluded from the statute’s reach “contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”44 Just as the Supreme Court had
now begun to read section 2’s reference to contracts “involving commerce” broadly to reach the edge of the Commerce Clause, presumably the exclusion in section 1 for workers “engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce” could be read with parallel breadth to exempt
almost all employment disputes from the FAA’s grasp. The Ninth
Circuit thought so, but the Supreme Court interred that reading in
2001.45 The Court held that the phrase “any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” had to be read in light of
the same provision’s earlier reference to seamen and railroad workers,
such that the entire exemption applied only to “transportation
workers.”46 In other words, despite reference to “commerce” in both
sections, the scope of the FAA sweeps broadly in section 2, but the
employment exception in section 1 is narrow.
Finally, the modern FAA has also been held to apply to statutory
causes of action. The Court began by distinguishing Wilko and ruling
that the duty to arbitrate reached claims under the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).47 Soon, the Court expressly overruled Wilko’s
41

Id. at 268–70.
Id. at 282.
43 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55–57 (2003) (per curiam) (citing, inter
alia, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).
44 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
45 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001), rev’g 194 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 1999).
46 Id. at 119.
47 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–42 (1987) (citing Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); see supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko).
Previously, the Court had begun to chip away at Wilko by permitting arbitration of statu42
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holding that claims under the 1933 Securities Act were not arbitrable.48 Perhaps most importantly of all, the Court held in 1991 that
statutory age discrimination claims could be arbitrated, a dramatic
expansion of arbitration into the workplace.49 Following that decision, all circuits now hold that employment discrimination claims
under Title VII—among the most frequently invoked federal statutory protections—can be subject to arbitration.50
B. Continuing “Hostility” Toward Arbitration
The massive expansion of the FAA described above happened
fairly quickly and without any legislative amendment of the relevant
provisions of the FAA itself. But while the pro-FAA turn might have
been congenial to a majority of the Court and some segments of elite
opinion,51 it was not embraced everywhere.
Certain state courts have been among the most vocal critics of
arbitration’s expansion beyond commercial contexts (though state
courts are certainly not alone in this52). Many of the major recent
decisions implementing the newly powerful FAA have been reversals
of state courts.53 In the Montana litigation that led to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, one of the
Montana justices wrote a concurring opinion to “explain a few things”
to “those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the pantory claims that arose in the context of international commercial transactions. See
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–40 (1985)
(finding Sherman Act claim arising out of international transaction arbitrable); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511–20 (1974) (finding Securities Exchange Act claim
arising out of international transaction arbitrable).
48 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–85 (1989).
49 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
50 See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748–49 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (citing decisions from other circuits and overruling Ninth Circuit’s prior
contrary precedent).
51 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing pro-arbitration sentiments
of Supreme Court Justices and certain interest groups).
52 Consider the pungent commentary of one federal bankruptcy judge:
The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional
rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid
odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.
....
. . . Arbitration was innocuous when limited to negotiated commercial
contracts, but it developed sinister characteristics when it became ubiquitous.
In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827–28 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
53 E.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Florida);
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Montana); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (Alabama); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 493 (1987) (California); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (California).
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acea for their ‘heavy case loads’ and who consider the reluctance of
state courts to buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy.”54
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially
at the appellate level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration
provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained
for, [Montana’s] laws are easily avoided by any party with enough
leverage to stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its
pre-printed contract and require the party with inferior bargaining
power to sign it.
....
Nothing in our jurisprudence appears more intellectually
detached from reality and arrogant than the lament of federal
judges who see this system of imposed arbitration as “therapy for
their crowded dockets.” . . .
It seems to me that judges who have let their concern for their
own crowded docket overcome their concern for the rights they are
entrusted with should step aside and let someone else assume their
burdens.55

When the case returned to the Montana high court after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s reversal, two of the state justices took the unusual
step of refusing to sign the order remanding the case to the trial court,
stating that “[w]e cannot in good conscience be an instrument of a
policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental and philosophically misguided as the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
this and other cases which interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration
Act.”56 In another case, the Chief Justice of Alabama wrote that the
U.S. Supreme Court had unconstitutionally expanded the boundaries
of the FAA; he defiantly concluded that the FAA still did not apply in
state courts notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s views.57 This is the
sort of open judicial insubordination usually seen only in cases

54 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring),
vacated sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
55 Id. at 940–41.
56 Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S.
Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16, 16 (quoting Montana Justices Trieweiler and
Hunt).
57 Selma Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Fontenot, 824 So. 2d 668, 677–78 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J.,
dissenting); see also infra notes 136–37 (citing comments from various courts and judges
about possibility of state-judge defiance).
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involving hot-button issues such as racial integration and religion in
public schools, and even then only with extraordinary rarity.58
Why have some courts resisted the Supreme Court’s campaign?
There are several potential explanations. In part it may just be a
matter of probabilities. The Supreme Court has staked out a position
close to the pro-arbitration end of the spectrum. Among the various
state judiciaries and the hundreds of federal judges across the country,
it would be surprising not to find a substantial number of judges who
have different preferences. These judicial doubters of arbitration’s
virtues might well say that they are not hostile to consensual alternative dispute resolution but are instead simply well informed about
arbitration’s shortcomings in certain contexts.59 In some instances,
this wariness of arbitration may dovetail with a more general skepticism toward the liability reform movement.60 It is inevitable that
some subset of these judicial skeptics of arbitration will hold their
views firmly enough that they will not automatically toe the Supreme
Court’s line. After all, to many people these are questions about basic
justice and the judicial role.
Further, there may also be more systematic influences that could
explain resistance to arbitration, at least to the extent it appears concentrated in state courts.61 State courts that resist the Supreme
Court’s federal policy favoring arbitration are in many cases trying to
58 Cf., e.g., Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1126–28 (S.D. Ala. 1983)
(refusing to follow Supreme Court precedent in school prayer case), rev’d in relevant part
sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).
59 For prominent critiques of binding predispute arbitration, especially in the consumer
and employment contexts, see, for example, Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001),
Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995), Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005), and
Sternlight, supra note 30. For contrary views, see, for example, Christopher R. Drahozal,
“Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549 (2008), and Stephen J. Ware, The Case for
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of Class
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254–64 (2006).
60 See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 656–61 (1999) (discussing linkage between
Alabama judges’ views on arbitration and larger tort reform battles).
61 The considerations mentioned in this paragraph, which tend toward the institutional,
are not meant to be exclusive. There could be other explanations for the differing attitudes
of federal versus state judges as well, such as those emphasizing sociological factors. See,
e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts’ Use of
Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 94 n.20 (1998) (“Perhaps
state judges’ heightened sympathy toward the unfairness claimed by consumers or small
businesses can be attributed to the fact that state judges may come from less wealthy or
elite backgrounds than do federal judges . . . .”); cf. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639,
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effectuate not their own preferences but fundamental state legislative
policies that restrict arbitration or apply heightened procedural safeguards. Thus, the leading Supreme Court cases slapping down
“rogue” state courts and establishing the preeminence of the FAA
often involve state courts that were enforcing state statutes that conflicted with the Supreme Court’s understanding of the FAA: Perry
and Southland from California and Casarotto from Montana all fit this
pattern, for example, and famously hostile Alabama likewise has a
state statute limiting the reach of arbitration.62 A decade ago, a score
of state attorneys general advocated overruling Southland’s preemption holding,63 and by the time of the recent Buckeye Check Cashing
decision, the number had swelled to a staggering forty (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).64 Further, many state judges are
elected and therefore are accountable to the consumers and the
employees that businesses (often out-of-state businesses) attempt to
bind to arbitration agreements. Indeed, arbitration has become an
important issue in some judicial campaigns, and pro-business interests
do not always prevail.65
Thus, while resistance to the growth of arbitration continues, the
Supreme Court’s dialectic of combating hostility to arbitration is
today largely anachronistic in that it has come unmoored from the
conditions that produced it. Old-fashioned judicial resistance to arbitration may well have stemmed from judicial arrogance or unsophisti665–67 (1981) (arguing that state and federal judges, while both collections of elites, have
different backgrounds and represent different social orders).
62 ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (LexisNexis 2002) (providing that an agreement to arbitrate
cannot be specifically enforced); see supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (discussing
Casarotto and citing Perry and Southland).
63 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (referring to
states’ amicus brief).
64 Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (No. 04-1264), 2005 WL 2477361.
65 Stephen Ware has written on the electoral dynamics of arbitration law in Alabama.
Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story: The State’s Experience with Arbitration Shows the
Connection of Law to Politics and Culture, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2001, at 24; Ware,
supra note 60, at 664–86. Roadside signs posted in anticipation of the November 2000
judicial elections stated “Arbitration: A License to Steal. Vote Democrat.” Id. Ware’s
study led him to conclude that “[t]he entire body of arbitration law seems to be shaped by
the campaign finance battle between plaintiffs’ lawyers and business” and that “arbitration
law in Alabama seems to have no doctrinal integrity that survives the vicissitudes of the
interest group battle.” Ware, supra note 60, at 662, 685. Arbitration has also been an
important campaign issue in Mississippi, where the famously plaintiff-friendly judiciary has
been mostly converted to the tort reform cause, in part due to the efforts of insurance
companies. See Cecil Pearce, High Stakes for Mississippi Tort Reform, INS. J. SOUTHEAST
REGION, June 21, 2004, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/southeast/
2004/06/21/partingshots/43442.htm (discussing business and insurance community impact
on Mississippi Supreme Court elections).
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cation. Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes rejecting (to
varying degrees) those judicial prejudices and demanding enforcement of arbitration agreements, in certain contexts, on more or less
the same terms as other contracts. Today, the Court still uses the
same hostility rhetoric even though the concerns animating the debate
have in large part shifted to considerations of federalism and local
control.
But whether one calls it “hostility” or not, the fact is that the
Supreme Court’s extremely favorable view of a sweeping, federalized
arbitration law is not shared by the people and officials everywhere.
The Supreme Court cannot change those preferences overnight, and
so resistance to arbitration continues to seek an outlet. And it has
found one.
C. Unconscionability as an Outlet
The Supreme Court’s fairly rapid embrace of arbitration was a
shock to the legal system, or at least portions of it. All courts and
jurisdictions were now required to enforce mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in almost every kind of contract, notwithstanding any
state common law or statutory law to the contrary. With all direct
means of resistance to arbitration shut down, the principal remaining
channel through which skepticism toward arbitration could flow
became the proviso in section 2 of the FAA stating that arbitration
agreements must be enforced except “upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”66
For a court wishing to strike back against arbitration, however, it
is not enough simply to invoke the word “unconscionability.” First,
under the separability doctrine, a court cannot invalidate an arbitration agreement contained in a larger contract based upon a defense
regarding the contract as a whole.67 Thus, a charge that an entire contract is unconscionable (or the product of duress, etc.) must be sent to
the arbitrator to decide, even though the arbitration clause is part of
the contract that is allegedly invalid in toto. A court can rule only
upon defenses that go to the arbitration clause. (The separability doctrine may seem strange as a matter of contract law, but, as we will see,
it makes much sense as a tool for monitoring compliance with the
FAA.68) Second, even when dealing with a challenge that targets the
arbitration provision, a court does not have carte blanche to use
66

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967). The
separability doctrine and Prima Paint are discussed more fully in Part III.C infra.
68 See infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text (discussing how separability doctrine
facilitates federal monitoring of enforcement of arbitration agreements).
67
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unconscionability however it likes. As the Supreme Court explained
in a key footnote in Perry v. Thomas:
An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as
a matter of federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” Thus state law, whether
of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2. A court may
not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration
agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that
in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under
state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement
to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement
would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect
what we hold today the state legislature cannot.69

Thus, a court may invalidate an arbitration clause based on general contract principles like duress or unconscionability, but the court
may not apply those doctrines differently in the context of arbitration,
singling out arbitration clauses for special scrutiny. As some commentators have put it, section 2 is a sort of “equal protection clause” for
arbitration agreements.70 (That federal law imposes this hard-tomonitor duty of evenhandedness on state law contract rulings is, of
course, the source of many of the problems of judicial federalism discussed later in this Article.)
Because a court cannot hold that arbitration agreements are in
themselves per se unconscionable—after all, the FAA makes arbitration favored as a matter of federal policy—courts’ analyses instead
typically focus on particular aspects of arbitration clauses that allegedly render them unconscionable or otherwise impermissibly frustrate
the plaintiff’s substantive rights.71 These aspects include:
69

482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citations omitted).
E.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1955 (2003); David Ling,
Case Comment, Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements: States’ Options After
Casarotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193, 193 (1997).
71 Instead of (or in addition to) using the language of unconscionability, cases involving
statutory causes of action often speak in terms of whether arbitration would effectively
deprive the litigant of the substantive rights conferred by the legislature. E.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1479–83 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The two inquiries are very similar in practice, though
unconscionability focuses more on state law. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60,
63–64 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868,
877–78 (11th Cir. 2005) (using substantive rights and unconscionability doctrines interchangeably). Where appropriate, this Article cites cases from both doctrinal lines.
70
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• limitations on the types or amount of relief that the arbitrator
can award, such as bans on punitive damages;72
• provisions that forbid class-wide or other collective
arbitration;73
• “nonmutual” arbitration clauses that require the customer or
employee to arbitrate all claims but that permit the drafting
party the option of proceeding in court;74
• clauses that select an allegedly biased arbitrator;75
• limitations on the extent of discovery available in the arbitral
proceedings;76
• clauses relating to the allocation of the costs of the arbitration
proceedings;77
• provisions stating that the arbitration proceedings, including
the result thereof, must be kept confidential;78
72 E.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2003);
Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 670–71 (S.C. 2007); State ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 277–80 (W. Va. 2002); see also David S. Schwartz,
Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003) (reviewing cases); Christopher A. Taravella et
al., An Annotated Arbitration Clause, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 263, 279–80 (2002)
(same).
73 E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1106–10 (Cal. 2005); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 267–75 (Ill. 2006); Muhammad v. County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 98–102 (N.J. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2032 (2007);
State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002). See generally William M.
Howard, Annotation, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions, 13
A.L.R.6TH 145 (2006) (reviewing cases); Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration
Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionablity, and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal
Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 759–73 (2004)
(same); Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215,
225–45 (2008) (same).
74 E.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir.
2004); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 691–94 (Cal. 2000);
Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 172–76 (Wis. 2006). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements To Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537
(2002) (reviewing issue of nonmutual arbitration clauses).
75 E.g., Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 49 P.3d 647, 650–51 (Nev. 2002); Graham
v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 173–77 (Cal. 1981).
76 E.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786–87 (9th Cir.
2002); Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 96–100 (Ct. App. 2004).
77 E.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2003);
McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267, 1273–74 (Pa. Super. Ct.), review denied, 853
A.2d 362 (Pa. 2004); see also Kelly Thompson Cochran & Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues
in Consumer Arbitration, 60 BUS. LAW. 785, 788–90 (2005) (citing cases). See generally
Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004) (detailing costs arbitration can impose on consumers and proposing regulatory and legislative solutions).
78 E.g., Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2007); Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809
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• provisions specifying that the arbitration will take place in a
distant forum;79 and
• provisions that allow the drafting party to change the terms of
the agreement.80
Additionally, because many courts require elements of procedural unconscionability or other faults in contract formation as well as
substantive unfairness before they will invalidate a contract,81 agreements to arbitrate are often attacked as procedurally unconscionable
or adhesive.82 Along similar lines, some courts, most notably in
Montana, have invalidated arbitration agreements using the contract
doctrine of reasonable expectations, under which an inconspicuous
term in a form contract is not binding if it would defeat the reasonable
expectations of the nondrafting party.83
The anecdotal impression that unconscionability arguments have
become increasingly prevalent and prominent can be bolstered with
numerical data:84

N.E.2d 1161, 1180–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see also Cochran & Mogilnicki, supra note 77,
at 787–88 (citing cases).
79 E.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1287–92 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc);
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1243–46 (Mont. 1998); see also Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1026–28 (1996) (reviewing cases).
80 E.g., Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 253–58 (5th Cir. 2008); Dumais v. Am.
Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002).
81 See generally 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF C ONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
82 E.g., Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281–84; Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729
N.W.2d 732, 742–45 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 737 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 2007); see also
Ware, supra note 79, at 1028–34 (reviewing issue of procedural unconscionability).
83 See infra Part II.C (discussing recent Montana cases).
84 One should keep in mind that I am not attempting to use this data on the prevalence
of unconscionability arguments in court decisions to derive conclusions about the impact of
unconscionability doctrine on real world behavior. Few interactions lead to disputes, few
disputes to lawsuits, few lawsuits to searchable decisions. See George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1984)
(discussing these problems of inference and bias).
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The dashed line in the graph shows the number of cases
addressing arbitration-related unconscionability arguments each
year.85 Lest one think that this apparent increase in the prevalence of
unconscionability challenges is an artifact of an overall increase in litigation (or in the coverage of the Westlaw databases) or that it simply
reflects the fact that all types of arbitration cases have become
increasingly common over this period, we can also measure those
unconscionability cases as a percentage of all cases involving arbitra85 These figures reflect the results, as of July 1, 2008, of running the following search in
the Westlaw ALLCASES database (which includes published and all available unpublished federal and state court decisions) for each of the included years: di(arbitrat! /s
unconscionab!) & (“9 U.S.C.” or “Federal Arbitration Act” or “United States Arbitration
Act”) & da([year]). In plain English, the search returns cases that (1) have a sentence in
the Westlaw-supplied digest field containing both the words “arbitration” and “unconscionability” (and their variants) and also (2) contain other terms that indicate that the case
concerns the FAA. Limiting part of the search to the digest field helps to exclude cases in
which the words “arbitration” and “unconscionability” appear together in the same sentence and yet which do not actually involve any substantial treatment of the concepts. I
hasten to add that this is an imperfect measure that is in different ways both overinclusive
and underinclusive. Nevertheless, we can draw comfort from the fact that a study that
involved a more individualized examination of cases from 2002–2003 identified 161
unconscionability-related arbitration cases, a figure almost identical to the 157 returned for
those years by this cruder measure. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration
and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004). Further, while
the exact numbers presented are subject to debate, the imprecision of the search should
not call the upward trend into question.
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tion (the solid line in the graph).86 Where unconscionability challenges once appeared in less than 1% of all arbitration-related cases,
more recently they have appeared in 15–20% of all cases involving
arbitration. (The reader might wonder about the dip in both measures
right before 2007. I will have more to say about this later.87) Other
observers agree that we are witnessing something of a renaissance for
unconscionability arguments.88
I want to be clear that the increase in the prominence of unconscionability arguments does not show that courts are employing the
doctrine inappropriately. As the Supreme Court closes off more
promising lines of attack, parties resisting arbitration have more
reason to raise unconscionability arguments, whether meritorious or
not. It could be, for example, that many arbitration provisions could
properly have been challenged as unconscionable in earlier years, but
it was unnecessary for litigants and courts to rely on that ground
because other doctrines achieved the same result more clearly. For
instance, until several years ago some courts held that the FAA did
not reach employment relationships.89 Given that clear legal rule,
there was little need to decide a more fact-specific unconscionability
challenge or even to raise it.90 Further, the chart above does not tell
us about the success rate of unconscionability challenges, and while
there is indeed some evidence of increasing success rates,91 it remains
true that even a surge in the success rate of unconscionability challenges would not necessarily suggest anything untoward. For
example, it might be that the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration rulings,
together with continued tort reform sentiment, emboldened some par86 These figures reflect the number of unconscionability-related arbitration cases as
determined above divided by the total number of arbitration cases, a figure retrieved by
running the following search in the Westlaw ALLCASES database for various years:
di(arbitrat!) & (“9 U.S.C.” or “Federal Arbitration Act” or “United States Arbitration
Act”) & da([year]).
87 See infra Conclusion.
88 For scholars who have noted a rise in unconscionability cases, see, for example,
Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements To Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470–71, Sandra
F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249
(2006), Randall, supra note 85, at 194–98, and Stempel, supra note 30, at 761–62.
89 E.g., Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999); Arce v. Cotton
Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117, 120–23 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
90 The Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams litigation illustrates the point. After the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s rule excluding employment contracts from the
FAA, see supra text accompanying notes 44–46, the Ninth Circuit on remand then
addressed (and agreed with) an unconscionability challenge to the agreement. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2002).
91 See infra Part II.B (discussing empirical evidence).
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ties to draft increasingly one-sided or burdensome arbitration provisions, so that the number of truly unconscionable agreements was
actually increasing over some period.
Nonetheless, the upswing in the prominence of unconscionability
doctrine is peculiar because, for a few reasons, it would not seem like
a very promising line of attack. While every contracts casebook
includes a famous unconscionability case such as Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co.,92 it is well known that unconscionability is generally a loser of an argument.93 Further, unconscionability does not
completely address the problem: Many of the features of arbitration
clauses that are often challenged as unconscionable really do not
strike one as a gross imposition on the particular person at issue but
rather strike at more broadly based considerations of public policy.94
(For example, a ban on punitive damages is hard to deem so grossly
oppressive to the individual as to be unconscionable, especially if full
compensation and attorneys’ fees are available.) The newfound
attraction to unconscionability is especially striking because the doctrine has been mostly in intellectual retreat for various reasons,
including the strength of the law and economics movement and
continuing emphasis on judicial “restraint.”95
Despite all of these defects, unconscionability at least has the
notable advantage of remaining available. The new popularity of
unconscionability and allied doctrines has, accordingly, been aptly
described by scholars as an attempt, using one of the few tools
remaining, to put the brakes on the pro-arbitration trend and restore
92

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
E.g., 7 JOSE M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (rev. ed. 2002) (“Most
claims of unconscionability fail.”).
94 Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1901 (2006) (noting
that true issue in some class-waiver unconscionability cases is whether waiver distorts
underlying substantive law).
95 See Stempel, supra note 30, at 812–32 (describing confluence of trends that have
made unconscionability unfashionable as method for policing contracts). This is not to say
that law and economics speaks with a single voice on the subject, for it does not. See
Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441 (2004)
(presenting competing law-and-economics accounts); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the
Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995) (providing qualified
support for unconscionability arguments); cf. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 294–95, 302, 315 (1975) (defending some forms
of procedural unconscionability doctrine on economic grounds but criticizing substantive
unconscionability doctrine). Criticisms of unconscionability are not necessarily linked to
the law and economics movement; consider, for example, the canonical academic attack on
unconscionability represented by Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
93
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some sort of balance.96 There is much truth in that view, but it is
incomplete in important ways. First, any balance or equilibrium may
be only temporary, for pro-arbitration courts will try to respond to the
new tools being used to limit arbitration. That is, arbitration jurisprudence is not at rest but is still evolving. And second, unconscionability’s allure is not limited to the fact that it remains available:
Another of its virtues is that it provides at least the opportunity for
furtive manipulation and evasion of review, making it a move that is
hard to counter directly. In the hope of providing a more comprehensive and dynamic account of the role of unconscionability, the rest of
this Article will examine the actions and reactions that are currently
shaping arbitration law.
II
CIRCUMVENTION

OF THE

FAA

Even judges who are remarkably dim bulbs know how to mouth the
correct legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules’
logical consequences.
— Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc. 97

This Part examines one half of the unconscionability game,
namely, the moves available to courts skeptical of arbitration. The
approach used here builds on the strategic instruments framework, a
type of positive political theory model developed by Emerson Tiller
and others.98 The basic insight of this approach, elaborated upon
96

Jeffrey Stempel describes the matter:
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, water seeks to be level, and ecosystems work
to retain environmental stability, the legal system has witnessed an incremental
effort by lower courts to soften the rough edges of the Supreme Court’s proarbitration jurisprudence through rediscovery of what might be called the
‘unconscionability norm’ . . . .
Stempel, supra note 30, at 765–66; cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with
Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 253, 260–61 (explaining that courts “use the tools available
to reach their desired outcomes” when they believe enforcing arbitration agreements
would be too inequitable).
97 413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (W. Va. 1991) (Neely, J.).
98 See generally Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002) (providing evidence from
environmental cases showing that courts of appeals selected grounds for their decisions
based on strategic considerations); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
349 (1999) (developing theoretical model according to which agencies and courts choose
decision instruments in order to manipulate costs of review); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew
L. Spitzer, Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992) (employing
similar framework to study Supreme Court’s choice between statutory and constitutional
grounds for decision).
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below, is that lower courts can choose the grounds for their decisions
in ways that reach a desired result and simultaneously make it difficult
for higher courts to review their decisions. The discussion below will
give the greatest attention to Supreme Court review of state courts, as
that is where the divergence of views is greatest and the federalism
stakes the highest, but much of the discussion applies to hierarchical
review more generally. Indeed, some of the analysis also applies to
what we might call nonhierarchical review: The lower federal courts
do not directly “review” state decisions in the appellate sense, but
they often need to apply state case law (such as, here, the state law of
contract formation and defenses); when they do, they must ensure
that state decisions are compliant with federal law. It would be unnecessarily tedious to multiply the analysis below so as to discuss all of
the various permutations—Supreme Court review of state courts,
Supreme Court review of lower federal courts, lower federal court
review of state courts, and so on—at each point, but some notable
differences will be identified where useful.
A. Theoretical Framework
It is appropriate to begin with a few words about the underpinnings of the general approach to judicial decisionmaking employed
here. To greatly simplify a complicated debate, one view is that judges
decide cases according to the dictates of the relevant laws, precedents,
and other authoritative legal materials as they honestly understand
them, while an opposing view holds that judges rule according to their
policy preferences.99 The latter view can itself be divided into various
forms. In one variation, judges directly vote their preferences.100
Also popular today, however, is the idea that judges are strategic or
sophisticated in some sense—that is, judges realize that the best way
to advance their goals might be through indirect means that reduce
the likelihood of overrides by higher courts or other political institutions such as legislatures.101 Overlaying these debates are controver99 For an overview of the debate and discussion of the contending positions, see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997), and JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 44–114 (2002).
100 This view is most closely associated with Segal and Spaeth’s work on the attitudinal
approach to Supreme Court decisionmaking. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 99, at 114
(stating that Supreme Court justices can “virtually always . . . engage in rationally sincere
behavior on the merits”). They argue that lower court judges are similarly motivated by
policy preferences but recognize that those judges usually face more constraints on their
behavior. Id. at 111 & n.80.
101 See Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
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sies over topics such as how much the fear of reversal acts as a
constraint on judicial behavior.102
As most commentators recognize, it is unlikely that the whole
truth resides in any of the contending theories of judicial behavior in
their purest forms.103 Individual judges likely act on a mixture of
motives, and the judiciary as a whole, which is composed of many distinct individuals, certainly does. Judges often follow precedents with
which they strongly disagree, even when the risk of being reversed is
low.104 For purposes of this Article, we need not embrace the view
that all (or even most) judges act strategically or otherwise deviate
from the traditional legal paradigm. We need accept only the relatively modest propositions that, whether or not they are fully selfconscious regarding their own conduct,105 (1) at least some judges
43, 43–48 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (contrasting strategic
approach with attitudinal approach).
102 This topic has itself generated a substantial literature. E.g., Frank Cross, Appellate
Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 369 (2005); David E. Klein &
Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a
Principle-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI.
673 (1994).
103 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394–95
(2007) (concluding that empirical work “strongly suggests that both politics and law
matter”); see also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2158–59 (1998) (stating that various explanations for compliance with legal doctrine “may
operate at different times and under different circumstances”).
104 Kim, supra note 103, at 394–404.
105 Those who advocate attitudinal models of judicial behavior often claim to be
agnostic about judges’ subjective cognitive experience. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra
note 99, at 433 (stating that whether judges are aware of ideological influences on their
behavior “doesn’t matter”). The topic of the cognitive foundations of various approaches
to judicial behavior is currently attracting increased interest. E.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., forthcoming Oct.
2009); Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences
in Legal Decision-Making, 68 J. POL. 308 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, ‘Ideology in’ vs. ‘Cultural
Cognition of’ Law: What Difference Does it Make? (Mar. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1111865.
One reason to favor explanations that involve some type of subconscious element is
that they permit one to accept political scientists’ evidence of attitudinal behavior while
also crediting what judges usually report about their own subjective experience: that they
sincerely try to follow the law. It may be that strategic models, as compared to more
directly attitudinal models, are harder to explain in terms of subconscious influences, given
that the former impute more sophistication and information to judges. For my part, I do
not find it so difficult to believe that people of good faith can be subtly influenced by the
risk of being caught, nor do I find it implausible that many judges have the sophistication—
and some have the intent—to engage in strategic behavior in order to avoid being caught.
In any event, whatever the cognitive processes, there is in fact some empirical support for
the strategic model in various contexts. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (providing theoretical structure and tentative empirical
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pursue their ideological/policy aims in some cases, and (2) their pursuit of those aims is impacted to some degree by the expected
responses of other judicial actors. More concretely, some judges disagree with the Supreme Court’s strongly pro-arbitration course, are
willing to oppose it, and will take the survivability of their doctrinal
choices into account when fashioning their arbitration rulings.106
The analysis here relies on the fact that lower courts can influence
the risk of reversal, and not just by changing the outcome they reach.
In any given case, there may be multiple legal grounds that could support a particular outcome—a case might be subject to resolution
based on constitutional, statutory, evidentiary, procedural, jurisdictional, or other grounds, and even within each of those categories
there may be multiple alternative routes to the same outcome. The
chosen basis for the decision can affect the likelihood of reversal by a
higher court, even when holding the decision’s bottom line constant.
Lower court judges realize this, and so they can manipulate their
grounds of decision both to advance their preferred outcomes and to
make review of their decisions more costly. This is the essence of the
strategic instruments approach.
support for strategic approach); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution
in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 638–41 (2000)
(citing articles providing empirical evidence for strategic approach); Kirk A. Randazzo,
Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in the U.S. District Courts (Feb. 1,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1114207
(testing strategic model of district court decisionmaking and finding that district courts are
constrained by anticipated responses of appellate courts); see also infra note 133 (citing
empirical support for strategic instruments approach in particular). But cf. VIRGINIA A.
HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 86 (2006) (finding lack of evidence that strategic considerations
influence decision to dissent on intermediate appellate courts). A general account of the
cognitive basis of the strategic approach is beyond the scope of this Article.
106 To the extent that Supreme Court review is at issue (as opposed to other forms of
hierarchical or even nonhierarchical review), the tiny percentage of cases that the Court
reviews might lead one to question whether fear of reversal could play an appreciable role
for a rational court. Cf. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in
the Twenty-first Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 350–53 (2002) (noting shrinking Supreme
Court docket, especially dwindling number of state cases reviewed). Yet while the overall
rate is small, particular types of rulings can receive very close scrutiny and exhibit high
grant rates. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An
Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
101, 108–12 (2000) (showing extremely high grant rates for liberal search-and-seizure cases
during part of Burger Court era); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court
Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 745–63 (2001) (documenting differential grant rates associated with various factors); Songer et al., supra note 102, at
692–94 (explaining that Supreme Court can achieve fairly effective control despite rarity of
reversals, in part because litigants act as monitors). In light of the Supreme Court’s proarbitration campaign and the mobilization of business interest groups, see infra notes
180–86 and accompanying text, I suggest that anti-arbitration rulings fall into one of those
rare categories of cases that do face an appreciable risk.
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1. Competing Decision Instruments
In the FAA/unconscionability context, we can posit two types of
competing decision instruments for invalidating arbitration agreements. The first type of instrument, which is really a collection of
slightly different possible rationales, would be a decision of a broad or
categorical nature: Arbitration agreements abridge the state constitutional right to jury trial, are per se (or presumptively) unconscionable
in certain contexts (such as employment), are inapplicable to certain
types of statutory actions (such as consumer protection claims), and so
on.107 The second instrument would be a more contextual ruling to
the effect that the particular arbitration agreement at hand is unconscionable (or adhesive, or contravened the nondrafting party’s reasonable expectations, etc.) and so need not be enforced as a matter of
generally applicable state contract law.108
The two decision instruments differ along several dimensions.
Three relevant attributes of the different decision instruments are as
follows:
Policy impact of decision refers to the likely legal impact of the
decision (primarily in the rendering jurisdiction, but potentially in
others as well).
Technical ease of review refers to the relative technical ease or
difficulty of determining whether a decision complies with the FAA,
due to, for example, the degree of transparency of the decision.

107 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[U]nder California law, a contract to arbitrate between an employer and an employee,
such as the one we evaluate in this case, raises a rebuttable presumption of substantive
unconscionability.”); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1161–65 (Cal. 2003)
(holding that state statutory claims for public interest injunctions are not subject to arbitration); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 11–15 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (contending that waiver of state constitutional rights of jury trial and access to courts
are judged by knowing-and-intelligent standard rather than by ordinary contractual consent rules); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 936–39 (Mont. 1994) (holding arbitration
clauses ineffective unless they comply with state statute requiring prominent notice),
vacated sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
108 The distinction drawn here between the two types of decision instruments is not
exactly the same as the familiar one between rules and standards, though there are certainly some parallels. The literature on the rules-versus-standards debate is large. For
examples of work that emphasizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of rules and
standards in terms of controlling potentially disobedient lower courts, see Heytens, supra
note 10, at 11 & n.47, and Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules
vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 39 (2000) (observing that, as opposed to misapplication of standards, “errors in rule application will tend to be more obvious and, therefore, more susceptible to correction on appeal”).
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Expressive ease of review refers to the expressive impact of
reversing or otherwise not following the decision.109 For example, is
reversal compatible with showing respect for the lower court or does it
call into question the lower court’s integrity and honesty?
These attributes have important consequences for appellate
review. In explaining those consequences, the discussion will focus on
review by the Supreme Court, though much of the analysis is generally applicable.110 Further, while I usually refer to Supreme Court
review of state court decisions, similar comments would apply to the
Court’s review of a federal decision that applies state law unconscionability doctrine. The chart below illustrates how the decision attributes map onto the two different decision instruments and how that
affects appellate review.
IMPACT

OF

TABLE 1
DIFFERING DECISION INSTRUMENTS
APPELLATE REVIEW

ON

Policy
impact of
decision

Technical
ease of
review

Expressive
ease of
review

Resulting
risk of
reversal

Broad, categorical
ruling (i.e., per se rule,
public policy, etc.)

High

High

High

High

Contextualized ruling
(i.e., unconscionability)

Low

Low

Low

Low

One might initially suspect that a court that was resistant to arbitration might seek to maximize the effect of its decision by choosing
the first decision instrument: a decision to the effect that arbitration
agreements are against public policy, are per se unconscionable, do
109 The inclusion of an expressive component of the cost of review represents an innovation in this Article, compared to other strategic instrument accounts.
110 One distinctive feature of Supreme Court review is that the Supreme Court’s docket
is almost wholly discretionary, so it is often important to distinguish between decisionmaking at the certiorari stage and the merits stage. However, some of the same factors
that reduce the likelihood of a grant of certiorari are also useful more generally in
preventing reversal of a decision. For example, a decision that is based on factual findings
is both difficult to reverse in any appellate review context and highly unlikely to be
reviewed at all by the Supreme Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . .
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); SUP. CT. R. 10
(“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”); H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 223–24 (1991) (providing evidence of rarity of Supreme Court engaging in factoriented review).
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not apply in certain contexts or to certain causes of action, or offend
another across-the-board rule. A decision that holds an arbitration
clause unconscionable based on a particularized, fact-intensive examination of the contract and circumstances of formation will have somewhat less direct impact than would a categorical rule,111 and to that
extent it would appear less attractive to such a court. Such reasoning,
however, would be shortsighted, because these different types of decisions differ in terms of how likely they are to survive and garner
adherence. As the following discussion will more fully explain,
reviewing and reversing an unconscionability ruling is very difficult
both technically and expressively.
2. Technical Difficulty of Review
A decision based on grounds such as unconscionability is opaque
to the reviewing court in several respects. Scrutinizing the decision
may require an immersion in the factual record (how small was the
print, how (un)sophisticated was the customer, what representations
did the salesperson make?).112 Certainly it will require grappling with
the details of state law, a matter on which the Supreme Court is not
expert.113 An unconscionability ruling thus takes advantage of the
lower court’s asymmetric information about both the record and the
content of state law.
Moreover, even for a person knowledgeable about the record and
state law, it will often be nearly impossible to tell if a court is applying
state unconscionability doctrine evenhandedly in the way the FAA
requires. This is so for two basic reasons. First, some contractual
issues arise exclusively or nearly exclusively in the arbitration context,
which means that there is no ready and obvious nonarbitration base111 See, e.g., Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (distinguishing California Supreme Court unconscionability case because it applied only in “limited circumstances” and because “there is no blanket policy in California against class
action waivers in the consumer context”).
112 Calling the decision below fact-bound is a common tactic in opposing certiorari, here
as in other contexts. See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 18, Ryan’s Family Steak
Houses, Inc. v. Walker, 546 U.S. 1030 (2005) (No. 04-1672), 2005 WL 2844933 (describing
unconscionability ruling below as “fact-specific” and “fact-bound”); Respondent’s Brief in
Opposition at 14, Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Kloss, 538 U.S. 956 (2003) (No. 02-1112), 2003
WL 21698586 (describing unconscionability decision below as involving “particular” and
“peculiar” circumstances). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases. Ryan’s
Family Steak Houses, Inc. v. Walker, 546 U.S. 1030 (2005); Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Kloss, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
113 See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (referring to Supreme
Court Justices as “outsiders” without special competence in law of various states); cf.
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 (1985) (stating that “district courts
and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their
respective States” than Supreme Court).
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line to use as a point of comparison. For instance, one recurring topic
is whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable if it provides that
any arbitration proceedings, and the outcome thereof, will be kept
confidential.114 The closest nonarbitration cognate would seem to be
a contract provision stating that any future lawsuit that results from
the parties’ contract, together with its outcome, would be confidential.
But, of course, one generally does not see such clauses because the
nature of our legal system is that court files and proceedings are (with
certain exceptions for trade secrets, national security, etc.) open to the
public, regardless of what the particular parties may prefer. Also
inapposite are confidentiality terms in settlement agreements: These
come into being when the parties agree to settle a dispute, not when
they begin their contractual relationship in the first place.115 So if a
court says that a confidentiality provision in an arbitration agreement
is unconscionable under state law, there is no solid nonarbitration
analogue against which to check that conclusion.
A similar difficulty in making apples-to-apples comparisons arises
with regard to one of the most often litigated issues in consumer arbitration agreements: whether bans on class or other collective arbitrations are unconscionable.116 One might think that there is a ready
nonarbitration analogue, namely, a contractual clause that does not
require arbitration but forbids bringing a class action lawsuit in court.
But on further reflection, one sees that such a clause might not yield a
good baseline for comparison after all, even assuming the law were
clear on how waivers of class actions in ordinary litigation should be
treated.117 In the ordinary litigation context, the alternative to a class
action suit would be proceeding in court on an individual basis. In
order to judge how that alternative compares with the burden of proceeding in arbitration on an individual basis, one would have to con114 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Consumers and other parties resisting
arbitration have criticized confidentiality because, among other things, secrecy advantages
repeat players, who already know how things have gone in previous arbitrations. See Ting
v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (deeming confidentiality provisions in
arbitration agreement unconscionable).
115 Cf. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir.
2004) (drawing parallels between confidentiality in arbitration and confidential settlements, but acknowledging that they “are not completely analogous”).
116 For samples of the large and growing case law in this area, see sources cited supra
note 73.
117 There is relatively little law on class waivers in the ordinary litigation context. But
compare Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wash. 2007) (invalidating nonarbitration forum selection clause because, inter alia, out-of-state forum would not allow suit
to proceed as class action), and America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d
699, 708–12 (Ct. App. 2001) (same), with Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d
1007, 1011–13 (D.C. 2002) (rejecting similar argument).
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sider a number of factors, including the predicted size (and variability)
of the awards in the two fora, the availability of attorneys’ fees (as a
matter of law and of contract), whether the plaintiff could proceed in
small claims court despite an arbitration clause, and how the costs of
the arbitration would be paid. Although one might be tempted to say
that the (usually) lower costs of arbitration make an individual proceeding less burdensome than an ordinary lawsuit would be, the need
to consider various factors, which are case-specific, makes it hard to
say that a fair-minded court would have to rule the same way when it
comes to both waivers of class action lawsuits and waivers of class
arbitration proceedings. So once again there is no clear cognate to use
to check the arbitration case law against general principles of state
law.
The second reason it is extremely difficult to tell if a court is
applying unconscionability evenhandedly is that, even when cognates
are available in principle, in some situations the law is just too indeterminate to tell whether a decision is discriminatory.118 Oftentimes,
past cases alone will not definitively dictate the outcome of future
cases. Take, for instance, the issue of clauses that specify that any
proceedings shall take place in a specified location only. Challenges
to such clauses can arise both with regard to arbitration agreements
and to forum-selection clauses more generally. Suppose that the
California state courts have held in nonarbitration situations that a
forum-selection clause specifying the courts of faraway Florida is
unconscionable but that a clause requiring a person who lives in San
Francisco to litigate in not-so-distant Sacramento is permissible. The
cases do not purport to establish a bright-line rule regarding how far is
too far. Suppose that there next arises a case involving a San
Francisco consumer challenging an arbitration clause that specifies
arbitration in Los Angeles. Unconscionable or not? A federal court
asking that question as a matter of first impression might think of Los
Angeles as more like Sacramento than Florida, but if the California
state courts have said this clause is unconscionable, can the federal
court really say that the state courts have decided the case differently
than they would have if the case had involved a nonarbitration forumselection clause? Probably not, at least not until the Los Angeles case
arises under a nonarbitration scenario and the state courts give a different answer. Unless the state court has misstated the governing
118 Some other commentators have perceived this risk as well. See Alan Scott Rau,
Does State Arbitration Law Matter at All? Part II: A Continuing Role for State Law, in
ADR & THE LAW 208, 214 (Am. Arb. Ass’n et al. eds., 15th ed. 1998) (observing that
vague doctrines such as unconscionability “provide[ ] abundant opportunity for covert
manipulation”).
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legal standards or has made anti-arbitration comments, the federal
court will just have to take its word that state law would invalidate a
similar provision in a nonarbitration context. This, of course, creates
an opportunity for noncompliance.
3. Expressive Difficulty of Review
Now, to be sure, the federal courts take the state courts’ word for
things all the time. That is, indeed, the norm. The official dogma in
our federal system is that the state courts are fully competent to apply
federal law (and, a fortiori, state law) and certainly can be trusted to
be honest in their decisions.119 This leads us to another way in which
the costs of reviewing an unconscionability ruling are high, especially
when it is a federal court scrutinizing a state court decision. Not only
is review technically taxing, but it can also be expressively difficult
given prevailing norms. Some reversals are more normatively
freighted than others. We are accustomed to seeing federal courts
conclude that a state court has erred on some matter of federal law,
but here we are confronted with something quite different. If the
state court quotes the proper federal standard and purports to generate an evenhanded application of unconscionability law,120 rejecting
the state court’s holding is tantamount to impugning the state court’s
honesty.
Admittedly, such an attack on a state court’s integrity would not
be completely unprecedented in the world of judicial federalism. One
parallel situation is the “adequate and independent state ground” doctrine, under which the Supreme Court will ordinarily refuse to review
a federal issue in a case if the state court’s judgment rejecting a federal
claim can independently stand on a state law basis, including the federal claimant’s failure to comply with state procedural rules for
119 As the Supreme Court wrote in limiting federal habeas review of state rulings on
Fourth Amendment issues: “State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. . . . [T]here is ‘no intrinsic
reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent or
conscientious . . . than his neighbor in the state courthouse.’” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494 n.35 (1976) (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)); see also Lonny S. Hoffman,
Intersections of State and Federal Power: State Judges, Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle,” 81 TUL. L. REV. 283, 286 (2006) (discussing Rehnquist Court’s general reliance on
state judges to adjudicate federal rights fairly).
120 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112–13 (Cal. 2005)
(stating that FAA allows unconscionability defenses but “forbids the use of such defenses
to discriminate against arbitration clauses,” while noting that “[t]here is no such discrimination here” (citations omitted)).
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presenting his federal claim.121 Despite the doctrine’s general deference toward state court interpretations of state law, the question
whether a state ground is truly “adequate” to support the judgment is
itself a federal question.122 Thus, a state procedural rule is not adequate to bar review of the underlying federal question unless the rule
is “firmly established and regularly followed.”123 The Supreme Court
can, if necessary, examine prior state decisions to see if there really is
such a procedural rule regularly applied in like cases.124 This facet of
the adequate state grounds doctrine is necessary, among other reasons, because otherwise state courts could opportunistically disregard
federal law sub silentio.125
A second useful parallel comes from situations in which federal
law protects an interest created by state law, such as property or contract rights. The federal protection could be nullified if, as a matter of
unreviewable state law determinations, the underlying property
interest were deemed never to have existed. Thus, as in cases under
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, the federal
courts may scrutinize a state court’s treatment of state property or
contract interests to prevent circumvention of the federal guaranty.126
Needless to say, the scenarios just mentioned inhabit a narrow
doctrinal cranny characterized by tension and suspicion. Their
assumptions clash with the usual pieties regarding comity and trust.
Indeed, it is illuminating that most of the key precedents deeming
121

See generally 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE§§ 4019–4033 (2d ed. 1996) (describing doctrine). The doctrine applies both in the
context of Supreme Court direct review of state court decisions and in the context of
review of habeas petitions at all levels of the federal court system. Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991).
122 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965).
123 James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984); see also Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S.
255, 263 (1982) (“State courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural
rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims.”).
124 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455–58 (1958) (concluding that procedural bar imposed by state court below was not supported by prior state
decisions).
125 See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court
State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 86–87 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s practice of state
grounds reversals appears to rest, at bottom, on the intuition that . . . there simply must be
some federal judicial mechanism for catching state courts that disingenuously manipulate
antecedent state law to thwart federal interests . . . .”).
126 For example, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), a Contracts
Clause case, the Court stated that “in order that the constitutional mandate may not
become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made,
what are its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired
its obligation.” Id. at 100. The Court then proceeded to scrutinize prior state decisions
and concluded that the decision under review was inconsistent with state contract law. Id.
at 100–09.
DURE
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state procedural rules “inadequate” because not consistently followed—that is, holding them not to be real rules but one-off
“cheats”—tended to arise in the politically charged historical context
of the civil rights era, in which there really was a strong reason to
disbelieve certain state courts.127 Similarly, one of the most famous
cases in which the Supreme Court found a state court to have manipulated state property law to defeat federal protections, Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, also arose in a contentious period of state
court resistance and recalcitrance.128 This is not to say that state
grounds have never been deemed spurious in other eras, but the doctrine does inescapably carry this baggage of distrust. Thus, when
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited some of these extraordinary cases in his
Bush v. Gore concurrence—in which he concluded that the Florida
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its state election laws “distorted
them beyond what a fair reading required”129—Justice Ginsburg
pointed out the expressive stakes involved:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s casual citation of these cases might lead
one to believe they are part of a larger collection of cases in which
we said that the Constitution impelled us to train a skeptical eye on
a state court’s portrayal of state law. . . . [T]his case involves nothing
close to the kind of recalcitrance by a state high court that warrants
extraordinary action by this Court. The Florida Supreme Court . . .
surely should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim
Crow South.130

Given the historical connotations, one can see that a Supreme
Court decision rejecting a state unconscionability holding as a discriminatory manipulation of state law would find itself in a rather remarkable category. We all know that the Supreme Court is strongly proarbitration, but such a ruling would really be pulling out the big guns,
in terms of federal-state judicial relations. Issuing such a ruling would
127 See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement,
61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 885–900 (1994) (describing how doctrine evolved in 1950s and 1960s
in response to perceived manipulation of procedural rules by some southern state courts).
128 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812); see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71–75 (15th ed. 2004) (discussing background of case); Charles
Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States—A
History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 3–12 (1913)
(same).
129 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114–15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
130 Id. at 140–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore
Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1739 (2001) (“Without
expressly saying so, the conservative Justices implied that the Florida Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretations in Bush were entitled to no greater deference in federal court
than those of renegade White supremacist nullifiers during the civil rights era.”).
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arguably reveal something about the Court’s values,131 namely, that it
thinks state discrimination against arbitration merits the same
extraordinary response, in terms of judicial federalism, as discrimination in the Jim Crow South. While some commentators have noted
parallels between state court resistance to civil rights in the 1950s and
1960s and the current hostility to arbitration,132 it would be quite
remarkable if the Court itself were to validate their similarity in this
way.
B. Support for the Strategic Model
We have now introduced a theoretical framework for understanding the attractiveness of unconscionability rulings in the arbitration context. To be sure, some applications of unconscionability are
completely compliant with the FAA. But is there reason to believe
that, in some cases, arbitration-resistant courts are using unconscionability to target arbitration agreements for special scrutiny? I believe
there is such evidence, and the next several pages will describe some
of it.133 It is important to recognize, however, that producing empirical proof of discrimination would be (at best) extremely difficult and
in one sense is almost beside the point. Pro-arbitration courts will
evolve doctrine in response to what they believe they are seeing, so
131 Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 167 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]his case has illuminated the character of an institution.”).
132 Stephen Ware compares Alabama’s responses to civil rights and to arbitration:
In both cases, an underlying issue was whether those with power in Alabama
courts would continue to inflict “home-cooked justice” on those without power
in Alabama courts. In both cases, it ultimately took direct action by the
United States Supreme Court to force Alabama into line with the country as a
whole.
Of course, there are differences, too. Injustices committed by pro-plaintiff
courts pale in comparison with injustices committed by those who resisted civil
rights. Nevertheless, I keep hearing echoes of that earlier “massive resistance”
when Alabama lawyers express opposition to federal arbitration law.
Ware, supra note 65, at 27 (footnote omitted). In a similar vein, one observer of the
Casarotto remand proceedings in the Montana Supreme Court has pointed out that the
refusal of two of the Montana justices to sign the remand order is reminiscent of the practice of some defiant southern judges during the civil rights movement. Reuben, supra note
56, at 16.
133 I note that there is some evidentiary support for the strategic instruments approach
in other areas. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 14, at 25–26 (showing that district
court’s choice between fact-oriented sentence adjustments and law-oriented departures
from Sentencing Guidelines depends on ideological alignment between district and appellate court); Smith & Tiller, supra note 98, at 71–72, 77–78 (finding relationship between
ideological direction of decision and appellate panels’ choice between statutory grounds
(e.g., Chevron analysis) and process grounds (e.g., review for “substantial evidence,” “hard
look” review) in environmental law cases).
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the suspicion of manipulation is enough. And there are certainly reasonable grounds for suspicion.
To begin with what we might call circumstantial evidence, there is
motive. As discussed above, some courts are not nearly as enthralled
with arbitration as is the Supreme Court.134 Whether because they
seek to honor state statutes, to follow the electorate’s wishes, or
simply because they believe arbitration is bad policy, these courts
have cause to oppose it. True, it is one thing to dislike arbitration and
quite another to bend the law to get around it. Yet the temptation to
act on the dislike may grow (whether consciously or not) given the
opportunity to do so without significant cost. And here there is certainly the chance to manipulate the law with relatively little risk of
detection, for we have already seen that Supreme Court review is
technically and expressively difficult in this area—technically difficult
because it is hard to tell whether state law is in fact being applied
disingenuously, expressively difficult because it violates norms of judicial federalism to say so.135
Further, at least some judges realize that they have an opportunity for evasion. As one said during a conference on arbitration for
state appellate judges:
I don’t see how [the FAA] could preempt anything we would do in
state substantive contract or other law. We would write our way
around it. We have had case after case where we have written our
way around the federal United States Supreme Court law. And
they have denied certiorari. There are hundreds of techniques to do
[sic].136

Likewise, some judges have in published opinions taken the unusual
step of accusing their colleagues of evading—not just misunderstanding—the controlling Supreme Court precedents.137
Motive, opportunity, and anecdote may not add up to a conviction. Fortunately, there is also some more systematic evidence that is,
134

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.2–3.
136 POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., THE PRIVATIZATION OF JUSTICE? MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE STATE COURTS: REPORT OF THE 2003 FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE
COURT JUDGES 117 (2006); see also id. at 119, 123 (reporting panel moderators’ summary,
stating that “[t]he sense was from the state court justices that they simply aren’t going to
kowtow to what the U.S. Supreme Court thinks state law should be, and they are going to
apply state law, and they are going to write their way around the FAA if they have to deal
with that preemption”).
137 See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 999 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting) (accusing majority of “chip[ping] away at United States Supreme Court
[arbitration] precedents broadly construing the scope of the FAA by indirection, despite
the high court’s admonition against doing so” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135
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while limited in several ways, suggestive. A study by Susan Randall,
for instance, examined the outcomes of unconscionability challenges
in two time periods—1982–1983 and 2002–2003. She found that in the
earlier period, unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements
were not especially prevalent (she found only eight, out of fifty-four
total unconscionability cases) and not notably successful (only one of
the eight succeeded).138 By 2002–2003, however, after the Supreme
Court had blocked off most other ways to challenge arbitration agreements, unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements came to
represent about two-thirds of all unconscionability challenges (161 out
of 235) and—more importantly—succeeded at twice the rate of
unconscionability arguments directed against other types of contracts.139 Similarly, a study by Stephen Broome examined over a
decade of California appellate decisions on unconscionability—over
150 cases in all. He found that unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements, which accounted for about two-thirds of all unconscionability challenges, succeeded at a rate several times higher than
the rate for other types of contracts.140
The aggregate data regarding rates of success are interesting, but
they are insufficient to show that arbitration agreements are victims of
discrimination. There are, to begin with, difficulties in drawing conclusions from such data, because the disputes that are litigated and
result in searchable court decisions may be unrepresentative. Beyond
that general point, the arbitration cases may simply differ from the
nonarbitration cases in relevant ways. The fact that arbitration agreements were more often held unconscionable may simply reflect the
fact that during the relevant period they really were, on average, more
unfair than other types of challenged agreements, wholly apart from
the requirement of arbitration itself. That would occur, for instance, if
drafters of arbitration clauses felt emboldened by their string of suc-

138 Randall, supra note 85, at 196. The small number of cases means, of course, that the
success rate is sensitive to small changes.
139 Id. at 194. Although Randall did not perform statistical tests (and, for reasons mentioned in the text, there are difficulties in drawing inferences because the arbitration and
nonarbitration cases may differ), the difference in the success rate for unconscionability
challenges in the arbitration context as compared to nonarbitration contexts in 2002–2003
is statistically significant (using a chi-square test, p < 0.001).
140 Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 44–48 (2006). With the caveat mentioned in the previous footnote,
it is worth pointing out that the difference in outcomes reported by Broome is also statistically significant (using a chi-square test, p < 0.001).

1458

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1420

cesses in the Supreme Court and thus began to push the envelope by
imposing increasingly burdensome and unexpected terms.141
What would be useful, then, is a more nuanced examination of
whether courts are employing different rules in arbitration versus
nonarbitration contexts. For example, if courts rule that a particular
limitation on damages is unconscionable in the arbitration context, do
they also hold a like limitation unconscionable in a nonarbitration
context? Both of the studies mentioned above go on to attempt to
provide this type of more contextualized analysis.142 Now, as
explained earlier, some issues that initially appear to provide good test
cases—the treatment of class-proceedings waivers in arbitration and
nonarbitration contexts, for one—actually turn out not to; holdings in
one context would not necessarily have to carry over to the other.143
That is, the same considerations that make it hard for a reviewing
court to tell whether a lower court is behaving evenhandedly also
make it hard for us to conclude that a lower court is not behaving
evenhandedly. Nonetheless, some topics do provide reasonably good
tests, at least in principle. Randall has concluded, for example, that
some courts more harshly scrutinize out-of-state forum selection
clauses regarding arbitral fora than similar clauses regarding litigation
in regular courts,144 and Broome believes that the observed high suc-

141 See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 15, at 325 (suggesting, based on review of nearly 400
decisions, that some employers’ arbitration agreements are “testing the limits of selfadvantage”); see also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (describing
an arbitration agreement that severely limited company’s liability and may have been
designed so that customers would not know that they had agreed to arbitration), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). It may be that, given the recent
successes of unconscionability challenges, the most aggressive arbitration clauses are now
being scaled back. Some business advocates provide such an account, admitting that some
early arbitration provisions were unduly burdensome but contending that the clauses have
now improved to become more attractive to consumers. See Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S. Ct.
2500 (2008) (No. 07-976), 2008 WL 534808 (“[C]onsumer arbitration provisions have been
evolving. At first, many provisions plainly favored the business that drafted them.
Invoking state unconscionability principles, several courts struck down these clauses
. . . .”).
142 See Broome, supra note 140, at 48 (stating that differences in aggregate outcomes are
result of different rules being applied); Randall, supra note 85, at 198 (arguing that “judges
are avoiding arbitration through arbitration-specific expansions of the doctrine of
unconscionability”).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 114–17.
144 Randall, supra note 85, at 214–16. The Randall article also finds discrimination in
other areas, such as objections to arbitral costs and confidentiality rules, id. at 198–209,
218–20, but those topics do not, in my view, have close enough nonarbitration analogues to
make for a convincing test.
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cess rate of unconscionability challenges in California results from the
courts applying different rules to arbitration agreements.145
It may be that the above studies still do not provide definitive
evidence of manipulation of unconscionability doctrine. This is not a
situation in which we can take a large mass of cases, code a few clearly
defined variables, and then employ the tools of statistical inference.
Instead, when we are careful about ensuring apples-to-apples comparisons, we are left with few cases; the nature of unconscionability is that
it is contextual and tries to account for the totality of the factual circumstances. Recognizing that proof may not be attainable—and is
not necessary in order to trigger a reaction from pro-arbitration
courts—we can, nonetheless, marshal some additional evidence in the
form of a case study that further bolsters and helpfully illustrates the
theory adduced above.
C. A Case Study
For an example of how a court can write its way around the
Supreme Court’s rulings and frustrate review through its selection of
decision instruments, one can consider a recent series of cases in
Montana. Recall Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,146 which was
discussed briefly in Part I.B, above. Casarotto involved a Montana
statute that provided that no arbitration clause was valid unless the
contract containing the clause had a notice printed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract alerting the signing party to
the clause’s presence.147 The Montana Supreme Court held that this
state statute was not preempted by the FAA and refused to send a
dispute to arbitration.148 Making matters more interesting, the author
of the majority opinion, Justice Trieweiler, added his own separate
concurrence that seemed to set forth the “real” reasons for his vote.149
The concurrence referred to arbitration’s “total lack of procedural
safeguards,” the financial burdens it places on consumers, the naı̈veté
of those who consider arbitration clauses voluntary, and the way arbitration allows corporations to operate “above the law.”150 Adhesionary arbitration clauses, he stated, “subvert our system of justice as we
145

Broome, supra note 140, at 64–65.
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
147 Id. at 683.
148 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994), vacated sub nom. Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
149 Id. at 939 (Trieweiler, J., concurring) (“The majority opinion sets forth principles of
law agreeable to the majority of this Court in language appropriate for judicial precedent.
I offer this special concurring opinion as my personal observation regarding many of the
federal decisions which have been cited to us as authority.”).
150 Id. at 940–41.
146
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have come to know it. If any foreign government tried to do the
same, we would surely consider it a serious act of aggression.”151
These anti-arbitration statements amounted to the judge writing his
own petition for certiorari asking to be reversed.
The U.S. Supreme Court did in fact grant certiorari, but only to
summarily vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of an intervening decision.152 On remand, Justice Trieweiler wrote the court’s
revised opinion and found no reason to alter the court’s previous decision.153 A dissent noted that the court had reaffirmed its prior
opinion without permitting new briefing and concluded that the court
was “simply unwilling to consider any analysis that would require a
change in the result it remains determined to reach.”154 The Supreme
Court again granted certiorari and this time reversed 8 to 1.155 While
conceding that “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2,” the Supreme Court held that
the Montana statute was preempted by the FAA because it “conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with
a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally.”156
The Court found this an easy case.157
The Montana court’s direct approach—relying on a clear legal
rule limiting arbitration and (worse) making anti-arbitration policy
arguments—was not too successful. Could the Montana Supreme
Court have achieved the same objective if it had been sly? Perhaps
so. The Casarotto plaintiffs argued to the U.S. Supreme Court that
the Montana statute could be upheld as nondiscriminatory because
the statutory notice requirement was just “one illustration of a crossthe-board [state law] rule: Unexpected provisions in adhesion contracts must be conspicuous.”158 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the
Court declined to address that argument because the Montana
Supreme Court had not cited any such general common law
doctrine.159
151

Id. at 941.
Doctor’s Assocs., 515 U.S. 1129 (1995) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)).
153 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596, 599 (Mont. 1995) (Trieweiler, J.).
154 Id. at 600 (Gray, J., dissenting).
155 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
156 Id. at 687.
157 The opinion was short, with only Justice Thomas dissenting (and only because he
continues to believe that the FAA does not apply in state courts at all). Id. at 689
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 687 n.3 (majority opinion); see also Brief for Respondents at 15–25, Doctor’s
Assocs., 517 U.S. 681 (No. 95-559), 1996 WL 115790 (advancing this argument).
159 Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 n.3.
152
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Before long, the Montana Supreme Court began using common
law contract doctrines to get around the Casarotto ruling. In a case
decided a few years after Casarotto, the Montana Supreme Court
declared an arbitration agreement unconscionable as a matter of state
law because it required only the customer, but not the drafting party,
to arbitrate.160 The Montana court—perhaps showing that it had
learned from Casarotto that one should mouth the appropriate
pieties—was careful to cite the federal policy in favor of arbitration
and to state that it was not “craft[ing] special rules which apply only to
arbitration provisions” but was instead applying “general principles
that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”161
But the real assault on Casarotto, albeit necessarily an indirect
one, came next in Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co.162 Again, the court
emphasized that it was now applying “generally applicable contract
law defenses” and “prior decisions which apply to any contract.”163 In
an opinion by Justice Trieweiler, the court deemed a boilerplate arbitration clause in a consumer’s standard-form contract unenforceable—not because of any unusually oppressive content but because
the consumer was unaware of the term and it was outside of her “reasonable expectations.”164 Although the Kloss court was not explicit
about what the broker could have done to create a valid arbitration
agreement, one might guess that the way to make the arbitration
clause enforceable would be to make sure it does come within the
consumer’s expectations, such as by explaining the provision to the
consumer . . . or perhaps by putting it in large print in a prominent
location.165 Of course, requiring special notices that highlight arbitra160

Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 994–96 (Mont. 1999).
Id. at 994, 996.
162 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002).
163 Id. at 8–9.
164 Id. at 6–9. The doctrine of reasonable expectations, a cousin of unconscionability, is
also sometimes used in other contractual contexts, such as to invalidate terms in adhesive
insurance contracts. E.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983);
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.09 (2d ed. 2004). But
cf. Counterpoint Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 967 P.2d 393, 396 (Mont. 1998) (denying plaintiff’s
request to apply reasonable expectation doctrine in interpreting unambiguous insurance
policy).
165 As Professor Burnham puts it in his insightful and colorful summary of the Montana
courts’ response to arbitration:
If the evil of the provision is that it is not reasonably expected, the cure is to
make it reasonable [sic] expected. How? By giving notice of it! . . . The
drafter accomplishes this goal by putting those provisions in bold print, in a
contrasting color, or, the wise guy reader is no doubt thinking, in underlined
capital letters on the first page of the contract.
Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 139, 194
(2005).
161
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tion clauses is what the U.S. Supreme Court said the Montana legislature could not do. Instead, now the same result is clothed in the
judicial rationale of the principle of reasonable expectations.
The story continues, as later Montana decisions have built on and
extended Kloss, suggesting that even a conspicuously displayed arbitration clause might still be outside of a party’s reasonable expectations.166 The Montana court’s rather aggressive use of the reasonable
expectations doctrine is all the more surprising given a twenty-yearold Montana decision that rejected a reasonable expectations challenge to an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract, even though the
clause was not explained or brought to the signing party’s attention,
observing along the way that, even back then, “arbitration clauses are
common, and may be universal, in brokerage agreements.”167
It is not completely clear whether Kloss and its progeny ultimately would withstand scrutiny under the FAA. Why, after all,
would an arbitration clause be outside of a person’s reasonable expectations, especially given the ubiquity of arbitration clauses, while other
contract terms are not? And while a general doctrine of reasonable
expectations certainly exists, it is often said that a term is “unexpected”—and therefore subject to invalidation—only if there is also
something substantively bizarre or oppressive about it or if it defeats
the purpose of the contract’s bargained-over terms.168 It may be that
the FAA would prevent a court from regarding an arbitration clause
as unexpected or bizarre in this way.
But correctness is beside the point for our purposes. For a strategic court, a decision does not have to be correct under prevailing
law; if the decision is too hard to reverse, that suffices. In that sense,
Kloss was a success: The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,169
despite arguments by petitioner and the amicus U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that the state court had simply dressed up the previous
166 In Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237 (Mont. 2005), the court
held that an arbitration clause could be outside a party’s reasonable expectations even
though notice of it was printed in bolded all-caps font above the signature line. Id. at
240–42; see Brief of Appellants at 2–4, Zigrang, 123 P.3d 237 (No. 04-455), 2004 WL
2319412 (describing arbitration clause); see also Larsen v. Western States Ins. Agency, Inc.,
170 P.3d 956, 959 (Mont. 2007) (stating that prominently displayed arbitration clause was
“insufficient to establish the weaker party’s reasonable expectation,” but upholding arbitration agreement based on other evidence). Zigrang is also notable because Kloss
arguably rested in part on the fact that the broker owed the consumer a fiduciary duty to
explain the arbitration agreement. See Kloss, 54 P.3d at 9–10. Zigrang made clear that a
fiduciary duty is not necessary to trigger the reasonable expectations analysis. See 123 P.3d
at 240–43 (engaging in reasonable expectations analysis absent fiduciary relationship).
167 Passage v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 727 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Mont. 1986).
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981).
169 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Kloss, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
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state statutory policy in common law garb in order to evade the
Supreme Court’s ruling.170 Indeed, it may be that the Court denied
certiorari precisely because those advocating review made it so clear
that the Montana court’s honesty was at issue.171 The respondent
aptly characterized the petition as a request that the Supreme Court
“look behind” the Montana court’s opinion in a search for animus,
and then its response ducked into the weeds of the Montana law of
reasonable expectations and fiduciary duties.172 Technically difficult
to review, expressively difficult to review, certiorari denied. The
Supreme Court has continued to deny review in similar Montana
cases in recent years.173
In sum, it appears that the ultimate outcomes of Montana cases
have not much changed in response to the Supreme Court’s
continuing endorsement of arbitration, except perhaps to move in the
opposite direction. The doctrinal basis has shifted, however, to
squishy state law doctrines like unconscionability and reasonable
expectations.174 The Montana court claims to be honoring its federal
law duty to apply those doctrines fairly, and so far the Supreme Court
has not disturbed those decisions.

170 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2–5, Edward D. Jones & Co., 538 U.S. 956 (No. 021112), 2003 WL 21698588; Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Edward
D. Jones & Co., 538 U.S. 956 (No. 02-1112), 2003 WL 21698587 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]
(“[T]he Montana Supreme Court has used the cloak of the common law to do precisely
what this Court ruled that the Montana legislature may not do by statute . . . .”).
171 See Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 2 (accusing Montana court of using “state-law
rules that are described under the rubric of general contract law, but in fact have been
fashioned solely to deal with arbitration agreements”); id. at 3 (“The Montana Supreme
Court’s decision is a classic example of judicial hostility to arbitration, expressed through
the discriminatory application of state common law. The court purported to apply the
state-law principles that govern all contracts. In fact, however, its refusal to order Kloss to
abide by the arbitration agreement that she signed reflected the court’s distaste for arbitration . . . .”).
172 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 4–5, 9–10, Edward D. Jones & Co., 538 U.S. 956
(No. 02-1112), 2003 WL 21698586.
173 E.g., Piper Jaffray & Co. v. Paffhausen, 547 U.S. 1163 (2006); Piper Jaffray & Co. v.
Tomazich, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006).
174 The result of this Montana case study thus parallels the result found in another strategic instruments study, which found that after the Chevron decision, courts reviewing
EPA determinations switched to process reversals rather than statutory interpretation
reversals, but the overall rate of reversal did not drop. Smith & Tiller, supra note 98, at
78–81; see also supra note 132.
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CIRCUMVENTION

So far, we have seen only half the story. Pro-arbitration courts
(as well as other actors, like the drafters of arbitration clauses175) can
be expected to respond. We now turn, therefore, to judicial strategies
for reacting to evasion (or, at least, what pro-arbitration courts perceive as evasion). Although it should be emphasized that this is not a
confrontation between state courts unified in opposition to arbitration
and a monolithic federal judiciary that supports it, we focus on the
federal courts’ responses, as those are the most fraught in terms of
judicial federalism.
From the point of view of the federal courts—both the Supreme
Court and the lower courts—the current state of play described in
Part II is unsatisfactory in a few ways. Because resistance to arbitration now expresses itself through unconscionability rulings, compliance with federal law is hard to monitor. This opacity is unattractive
from a neutral, rule-of-law perspective. Also, and again quite apart
from one’s take on arbitration, deviation from the commands of federal law is problematic from the point of view of the Supremacy
Clause and the nationalist values expressed in venerable cases such as
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.176 And, not least, for strongly proarbitration courts like the U.S. Supreme Court, the current situation is
unattractive in terms of policy outcomes as well. Difficulty in monitoring compliance may be acceptable to reviewing courts when they
are satisfied that lower courts share their policy preferences, but not
when the lower courts have opposing preferences. Indeed, this is
exactly the type of situation in which a reviewing court would want a
highly transparent and determinate doctrine precisely in order to control the lower courts.177 That is to say, the current doctrinal regime is
175 Businesses that rely on arbitration agreements have not stood still in the face of the
increasing popularity of unconscionability arguments. For example, financial services companies encouraged Utah to enact legislation expressly validating contractual waivers of
class proceedings; combined with Utah choice-of-law clauses, this legislation can
counteract unconscionability rulings in other states. See Peter Geier, Utah Passes Key
Class Action Waiver, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 3, 2006, at 4 (describing passage of law validating
class action waivers in consumer contracts); see also Homa v. Am. Express Co., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 440, 447–51 (D.N.J. 2007) (enforcing Utah choice-of-law clause and concluding
that class waiver was not unconscionable under Utah law).
176 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (affirming that Supreme Court can review decisions of
state high courts to ensure compliance with federal law).
177 Cf. Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 326, 339 (2007) (explaining that rational reviewing court would choose
between determinate rules and flexible standards depending on degree of alignment
between its policy preferences and those of lower courts). The more general point being
made here is that doctrine reflects not just legal considerations, and not just the principal’s
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a bad fit, from the principal’s point of view, given the clashing preferences of the principal and its agents.
What can the federal courts do in response to arguably noncompliant state unconscionability rulings? For the U.S. Supreme Court, the
immediate question is what to do with all the petitions for certiorari
that challenge questionable unconscionability rulings. The problem
confronts the lower federal courts too, because they also have to
review state unconscionability decisions, though somewhat less
directly. Agreements to arbitrate do not by themselves trigger the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts, but arbitration-related issues
arise in cases that for independent reasons (diversity of citizenship, for
example) do come within the district courts’ jurisdiction.178 When a
party resisting arbitration argues that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, that party will sometimes be able to cite an on-point
state decision invalidating an arbitration agreement based on what
purports to be a generally applicable principle of state law. Federal
courts follow state decisions on state law, but here there is the complication that the state unconscionability ruling is valid under the FAA
only if it treats arbitration clauses evenhandedly.179 Unlike the
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts cannot simply deny certiorari
and avoid ruling on these difficult questions.
Federal courts have several ways to respond to the questionable
state law unconscionability decisions they confront. These include
swallowing the questionable decision despite the court’s misgivings,
rejecting the state decision despite its facial bona fides, and—most
interesting—rewriting the rules to shift authority away from state
courts and make monitoring easier. This Part canvasses the alternatives, examining the pros and cons of each and noting as well what the
federal courts actually appear to be doing.
A. Looking the Other Way
There is no lack of voices calling for the Supreme Court to do
something about the perceived epidemic of unconscionability rulings.
preferences, but responds to principal-agent problems and the need to control lower
courts.
178 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983) (recognizing that FAA “creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction”); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006) (authorizing stays of
litigation and orders compelling arbitration in cases within district courts’ preexisting jurisdiction). Whether federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving arbitration may be
expanding is addressed in Part III.C.3, infra.
179 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
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One finds this call in numerous articles180 and, not surprisingly, in the
court filings of influential business groups and pro-business foundations.181 They are joined by a number of prominent judges who have
also expressed their support for, or at least expectation of, Supreme
Court review of the issue.182 Unconscionability is, quite simply, one of
the most important issues out there when it comes to the enforcement
of arbitration agreements.
Certainly the Court has had ample opportunity to heed the call to
action. The last several years have yielded a bumper crop of petitions
for certiorari seeking to enforce arbitration agreements invalidated by
lower courts on the basis of unconscionability (and related state law
defenses). Since 2000, there have been dozens of petitions for certiorari raising the issue,183 many filed by prominent Supreme Court litigators. These petitions include a number of petitions that enjoyed
support from influential interest groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, which would be expected to increase the odds of a grant.184
Yet the Court let them pass by, despite its strongly pro-arbitration
leanings.
180 E.g., Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to
Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 62, 92; Eric J.
Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
761, 783 n.117 (2003); cf. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 67 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court surely would review state
courts’ unconscionability rulings to the extent necessary to prevent the unconscionability
doctrine from effectively nullifying the FAA with respect to a huge class of contracts.”).
181 See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 11–16 (noting increasing use of common
law doctrines like unconscionability to invalidate arbitration clauses).
182 See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1313 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“I would not be the least surprised to see the Supreme Court of
the United States soon take a close look at whether the unconscionability doctrine, as
developed by some state courts, undermines the important policies of the Arbitration
Act.”); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 999 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“I
therefore urge the [U.S. Supreme Court] to clarify once and for all whether our approach
to arbitration law comports with its precedents.”).
183 List on file with the New York University Law Review.
184 From May 2004 to August 2007, the grant rate in cases in which the Chamber of
Commerce filed an amicus brief at the certiorari stage was twenty-six percent; for the
Pacific Legal Foundation, which has also made filings at the certiorari stage in support of
some of these petitions, the grant rate is twenty-eight percent. SCOTUSblog, Top Sixteen
Cert.-Stage Amicus Brief Filers from May 19, 2004 to August 15, 2007, http://www.
scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Top%2016%20Amici.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,
2008). See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1124 (1988) (concluding that presence of amicus briefs at petition stage is associated with substantial and
statistically significant increases in grant rate); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme
Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 753–54 (2001) (same).
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Why the hesitation? The analysis presented in this Article suggests an answer. The pro-arbitration Supreme Court finds itself in the
position of having picked most of the low-hanging anti-arbitration
fruit. The important state statutes that directly target and disadvantage arbitration have been invalidated in cases such as Southland 185
and Casarotto.186 Whether or not those cases were correctly decided,
they were simple in that they involved relatively clean questions of
federal law. To the extent that state courts have now retreated to
more opaque rulings such as unconscionability, noncompliant decisions are much more difficult to detect and correct.
The lower federal courts of course lack the luxury of simply
denying certiorari when they are presented with the question of
whether to follow what looks like a questionable state unconscionability ruling. Some have tried to steer a middle path between violating
the etiquette of judicial federalism and wholesale abdication of monitoring. A 2004 Fifth Circuit case, involving a procedural unconscionability challenge, exemplifies this approach.187 A recent on-point
Mississippi Supreme Court case, Taylor, had supported the unconscionability attack.188 The Fifth Circuit followed the Mississippi case, but
it was not content to let the state courts off too easily, so it dropped a
footnote in which it warned:
It is important to note here that if the Mississippi courts were to
limit the applicability of the procedural unconscionability approach
outlined in Taylor to arbitration agreements only, or were repeatedly to apply a different approach to other contractual provisions,
the issue of discrimination against arbitration under the FAA may
come into play.189

Thus the federal court was willing to give the state court the benefit of
the doubt this time, but it seems to be putting the state court “on
notice” and signaling that next time may be different.
B. Calling Them on It
At some point, one imagines that the pressure of looking the
other way becomes hard to bear. Another obvious response to
manipulation is to “call them on it.” If a certain court is using uncon185

See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text.
187 Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004).
188 Id. at 428 (citing East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002)).
189 Banc One, 367 F.3d at 432 n.3; see also Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that court “must exercise care in
enforcing state doctrines of unconscionability to invalidate arbitration clauses” and that
subsequent events might show that purportedly evenhanded state decisions are in fact
discriminatory).
186

1468

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1420

scionability against arbitration clauses in ways it is not used in other
contexts, reviewing courts could say so.
This strategy too has drawbacks. Federal courts generally regard
state courts as trustworthy partners in enforcing federal law. Or, at
least, etiquette demands that they so affirm, even if they harbor suspicions. To actually bring the suspicions into the light would be an
extraordinary move, the stuff of federal-state tensions over civil rights
fifty years ago. After all, as the Supreme Court tells us, today “[w]e
are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to . . . obey the binding
laws of the United States.”190
To be sure, reviewing courts can reject a suspicious decision
without calling it so. They will label it a “mistake” or a “misunderstanding,” even where something more willful is afoot, in order to
lower the stakes.191
The important point here, however, is that the target courts themselves to a significant degree control whether the reviewing court can
assume the pose of the polite corrector of good-faith error. If a state
court says that it understands the law and that some contractual feature “would be unconscionable whether applied in a lawsuit or in arbitration,”192 how can a federal court respond? A sophisticated state
court—one that states the governing law correctly, expresses the
appropriate pro-arbitration sentiments,193 and the like—can raise the
stakes substantially and make review extremely difficult for the federal courts. As Professor Monaghan wrote in the related context of
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, “few indeed will
be the occasions in which the Court will be prepared explicitly to
charge the state-court judges with violating their oaths to support the
Constitution,” including the Supremacy Clause that requires them to
follow federal law.194
190

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
A good illustration, from a different context, is the Supreme Court’s recent second
reversal of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in the Smith v. Texas death penalty case.
127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007). Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court repeatedly referred to the
court below’s “misunderstanding” or “confusion,” id. at 1690, 1698, when an equally plausible assessment would be that the Texas court tried to frustrate the Supreme Court’s prior
mandate through the opportunistic manipulation of state procedural rules.
192 Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 91 (N.J. 2006) (invalidating class-arbitration waiver), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2032 (2007).
193 See, e.g., Iberia, 379 F.3d at 169 (following Louisiana unconscionability ruling and
observing that “[t]he [state] court recognized that arbitration is favored in the law and
cited Louisiana’s cognate to 9 U.S.C. § 2”); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1110, 1113 (Cal. 2005) (criticizing state lower court for harboring “the very mistrust
of arbitration that has been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court” but nonetheless striking down class-action waiver (internal quotation omitted)).
194 Monaghan, supra note 70, at 1958.
191
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Given the difficulties involved, we should expect that the
Supreme Court will look for any remaining straightforward antiarbitration decisions that arise. Indeed, the Court recently reviewed a
case concerning the validity of a California statute that diverts some
entertainment industry disputes to an administrative board even
where the parties have an arbitration agreement.195 This case did not
appear to be very important in terms of having a broad impact and
was in that sense a poor candidate for certiorari. But it presented a
readily manageable question of preemption, and in that way it was
attractive.
To gaze into the crystal certiorari ball, one could predict that
another likely future target would be California’s rule that some types
of state statutory claims for injunctive relief are not arbitrable because
the injunctive relief is meant to protect the general public from wrongdoing.196 This is the type of categorical legal ruling that is transparent
to a reviewing court. Assuming that the Supreme Court believes
California’s rule is wrong, which seems likely,197 it is a strong candidate for reversal.
If the Supreme Court were to take an unconscionability case, one
would expect it to be one that misstates the governing federal law,
openly expresses hostility to arbitration, obviously deviates from the
unconscionability rules applied in other contexts, or the like. Perhaps
the Court would be able to sidestep the unconscionability issue by
adopting a broader theory of implied federal preemption. Taking a
case that comes from the federal courts rather than from the state
courts, even though the applicable law is the same (e.g., a Ninth Circuit case applying California unconscionability law), would also lower
the federalism stakes.
The Court may well at some point resolve an unconscionability
case head-on despite the difficulties involved. (It can’t keep turning
down the Chamber of Commerce forever, can it?198) If it does take
195 Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008) (holding portions of California Talent Agencies Act preempted by FAA).
196 See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1161–65 (Cal. 2003) (holding
that claims for injunctive relief under state unfair competition and false advertising statutes
are not preempted by FAA); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 75–79 (Cal.
1999) (holding that claims for injunctive relief under Consumer Legal Remedies Act are
not preempted by FAA). See generally Thomas A. Manakides, Note, Arbitration of
“Public Injunctions”: Clash Between State Statutory Remedies and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 433 (2003) (discussing issue and reviewing cases).
197 For a defense of the California decisions, see David S. Schwartz, State Judges as
Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State
Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 148–51 (2004).
198 See supra note 184 (discussing certiorari grant rates for cases in which Chamber of
Commerce filed amicus brief).
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such a case, and if it reverses, that likely will not be the sum of its
response to the rise of unconscionability, however. For one thing, the
court below might have made obvious mistakes, and so cleverer
unconscionability rulings might still be possible. But even apart from
that, the fact-specific nature of the doctrine means that cases will
continue to arise and that the Supreme Court’s decision could plausibly be distinguished. Pro-arbitration courts need more systematic, if
indirect, tools as well. And in fact they are already using such tools.
C. Changing the Rules: Federalization and Allocation
The Supreme Court (and, to a lesser extent, the lower federal
judiciary) has an advantage in the unconscionability game in that it is
not just a player but also an umpire and even a rulemaker, at least
unless Congress acts. Some recent developments show that perhaps
the most promising federal response to noncompliance will not be
direct confrontation but instead the indirect response of changing the
doctrinal regime. In particular, federal courts are increasingly suggesting that more and more challenges to arbitration agreements—
including unconscionability arguments—are for the arbitrator to
decide; this allocational principle is regarded as a matter of federal
law. Federalization of the allocation question is the ultimate trump
card in the unconscionability game: There is no need to question
hard-to-scrutinize state law rulings if one takes away, as a matter of
federal law, the authority to issue them in the first place.199
To understand the new federalized allocation rule that may be
emerging, one first needs to appreciate the Supreme Court’s decadesold decision in Prima Paint, which also established an allocation
rule. 200 The Court there confronted a claim that a contract had been
formed through fraudulent inducement and that therefore the contract, including its arbitration clause, was unenforceable; the arbitration clause itself had not been the subject of any alleged
199 The strategic substitution of an allocation rule for a less easily monitored substantive
rule would not be unprecedented; the Supreme Court apparently used the tactic in administrative law, shifting authority to administrative agencies and away from ideologically
adverse lower courts. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the “Chevron”
Puzzle, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 68, 71–81 (explaining changes in
administrative law doctrines in terms of allocations of authority to decisionmaking body
that is politically closest to Supreme Court); cf. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1117 (1987) (explaining how allocation rules
can help ensure uniformity across country despite limited opportunities for Supreme Court
review).
200 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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misrepresentations.201 On the one hand, one can see how it would be
strange to send such a case to arbitration, given that if the arbitrator
concludes that the contract as a whole was fraudulently induced, that
would seem to undercut the arbitrator’s very authority to decide anything. On the other hand, if the court were to review the claim of
fraudulent inducement and deem the contract valid, then a valid
agreement to arbitrate disputes would have been effectively nullified.
Neither solution is completely satisfactory, but the Court resolved the
dilemma in favor of arbitration: The arbitrator should resolve the
claim that the entire agreement, as opposed to the arbitration clause
in particular, was fraudulently induced.202 This has come to be known
as the separability doctrine, because an arbitration clause is regarded
as separate from the contract as a whole.203 As long as a court can
identify a theoretically distinct agreement to arbitrate something,
defects in the container contract will not invalidate that separate
agreement.204
At least as far as Prima Paint’s separability rule goes, challenges
to an arbitration clause itself are for the courts. The claim that the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes was itself invalid would need
to be resolved by a court, for arbitral authority to resolve disputes
comes only from (valid) consent.205 Otherwise, a party would be subjected to the adjudicative power of a person clothed with no authority.
Thus, a claim that an arbitration clause was unconscionable or illegal
because arbitration is itself violative of public policy would have to be
a matter for a court to decide—though of course it would be a very
easy decision, because public policy favors arbitration in almost all
contexts. As noted earlier, however, the frequent unconscionability
challenges we are now witnessing typically attack not the policy
favoring arbitration per se but instead focus on particular aspects of
arbitration clauses that allegedly render them unconscionable or oth201

Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 403–04.
203 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 121 (2007).
204 Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need To Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 14–28 (2003). Because Prima Paint
relies on the existence of consent to arbitrate, certain types of arguments should be
resolved by the court even though they apply to the entire contract. For example, if one
party claims that his signature on the container agreement has been forged and so he has
not agreed to anything at all, that should be decided by the court. See Chastain v.
Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992). Admittedly, the distinction
between cases like Chastain and those like Prima Paint is sometimes elusive.
205 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960) (“For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”).
202
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erwise impermissibly frustrate the plaintiff’s substantive rights—limitations on damages, bans on collective arbitrations, high costs, and the
like.206
Who—court or arbitrator—should rule upon the currently popular challenges to these aspects of an arbitration clause? It is an
important question, and not an easy one. On the one hand, it can be
argued that the logic of Prima Paint dictates that the arbitrator
decide.207 The various problematic restrictions and burdens may be
located in the arbitration provision of the contract, but they are logically separable from the underlying agreement to arbitrate disputes.
On this view, it is a mistake to view these challenges as impugning the
fundamental agreement to arbitrate itself.208 On the other hand, there
are also reasonable arguments for assigning decisional authority to the
court.209 These types of challenges do strike more closely at the duty
to arbitrate itself than is true of a defense that goes to the contract as a
whole, like the defense of fraudulent inducement involved in Prima
Paint. We might worry that the arbitrator’s self-interest would distort
the decision. And assigning these decisions to the court would not
destroy the benefits of arbitration by deciding the merits of the underlying dispute, as would often happen if the challenge involved the contract as a whole.
For our purposes, we are not concerned with which view is actually correct in some abstract sense but are rather interested in where
the law appears to be going and why. To be sure, there has been and
still is much disagreement and confusion in the courts, which makes it
difficult to state definitively what the law is or was, much less to identify a clear change in doctrine. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that,
rightly or wrongly, many courts have for a long time ruled on unconscionability challenges to various aspects of arbitration agreements
(and many courts still do)—occasionally expressly stating that the
matter was for the court, other times simply so assuming without a
206

See supra notes 71–80 and accompanying text.
See Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of ‘Consent,’ 24 ARB.
INT’L 199, 259–64 (2008) (contending that separability doctrine gives arbitrator authority to
rule on validity of remedial limitations); Rau, supra note 204, at 58–66 (same).
208 Even according to this view, there may be certain types of offensive provisions that
are so wrapped up with the basic agreement to arbitrate that there is no way to separate
them out. These might include challenges to the site of arbitration or the impartiality of
the arbitrator, for example. Rau, supra note 204, at 67–70. That is, even if we were to
permit the arbitrator to rule upon whether a limitation on the damages he can award is
valid, it is hard to see how we could sensibly send to the arbitrator the claim that the
arbitrator is biased.
209 See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses:
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 79–82 (2003) (contending that most issues regarding remedial limitations are for court to decide).
207
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second thought.210 Even fairly recently, defendants did not even
argue that such matters were for the arbitrator.211 But this may be
starting to change. In the last several years, one can discern the outlines of a nascent trend toward a federal rule shifting more authority
over such challenges to the arbitrator, so that the arbitrator would
decide whether (for example) a bar on punitive damages or collective
proceedings or discovery in arbitration is valid.212 Perhaps it is just
210 See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47, 52–55 (1st Cir. 2006) (addressing
claim that limitations on damages, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and class proceedings were
unenforceable because they prevented vindication of statutory rights); Jenkins v. First Am.
Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir. 2005) (addressing claim that class
action waiver was substantively unconscionable); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150–52
(9th Cir. 2003) (addressing claim that terms regarding class actions, arbitrator fees, and
confidentiality were substantively unconscionable); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing claim that fee-splitting provisions
were unenforceable because they prevented vindication of statutory rights); Broemmer v.
Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1015–17 (Ariz. 1992) (addressing claim
that arbitration agreement was adhesive and unduly favored drafting party); Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 146–52 (Ct. App. 1997) (addressing claim that unilateral duty to arbitrate and limitations on remedies were unconscionable); State ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 271, 278–82 (W. Va. 2002) (addressing claim that various
provisions, including class action waiver, damages limitation, and cost provisions were substantively unconscionable); see also June Lehrman, On the Threshold of Arbitration, L.A.
LAWYER, Dec. 2003, at 25 (“Extensive case law has developed across the country from
challenges to arbitrability based on the defense of unconscionability. Such challenges have
been routinely decided by courts, not arbitrators.”); Wilson, supra note 73, at 781 (noting
that courts have decided challenges regarding class arbitration waivers “without even considering that the issue might be one that the arbitrator should decide”). As noted in the
text, the case law on this point has never been uniform, and thus one can certainly find
older cases that view certain challenges as matters for the arbitrator. E.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir. 1997) (sending challenges to availability of attorneys fees and punitive damages to arbitrator, though ruling on objection to
limitations on discovery).
211 Lehrman, supra note 210, at 25 n.61; see, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 165 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that parties agreed that unconscionability claims were for court).
212 It should be noted here that we can distinguish between two different senses in which
a challenge to some aspect of an arbitration clause could be shifted to the arbitrator:
(1) The arbitrator is given the authority to decide the challenge because that issue is
considered one of the matters the parties have agreed to arbitrate, such that the arbitrator’s decision on that matter, just like his decision on the merits, can be reversed only in
extraordinary circumstances.
(2) The arbitrator is given the initial authority to consider an unconscionability challenge, but that decision is subject to plenary review later by a court (i.e., without the
extreme deference normally accorded arbitral determinations).
As against the traditional baseline of judicial authority to resolve unconscionability
both initially and conclusively, the first option above changes the ultimate division of
authority between courts and arbitrators, while the second option is primarily a change of
timing.
As option 2 recognizes, the order of the decisionmaking need not necessarily dictate
the scope of later judicial review. Some European systems, under the doctrine of
competence-competence, let the arbitrator make initial decisions about his own authority,
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that courts are finally, at long last, getting it right. But if the law in
fact says that these challenges are for the arbitrator, why has it taken
most people so long to start catching on? The framework employed in
this Article suggests one answer: because there was no pressure to
shift the locus of decisionmaking—until some courts started using
unconscionability opportunistically. The following pages will describe
these straws in the wind and what they might augur.
1. Recent Supreme Court Allocation Decisions
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the allocation problem in the context of unconscionability, several of its
recent decisions are portentous.
The first decision of note is Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna,213 which involved a dispute arising from a payday loan
agreement that was allegedly void and indeed criminally usurious
under state law. The Florida high court refused to enforce the arbitration clause in the parties’ contract, concluding that the entire contract
was a nullity, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and sent the dispute to arbitration. The Court began by emphasizing that Prima
subject to subsequent plenary court review. See John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1122–31 (2003) (describing different versions of
competence-competence); Rau, supra note 204, at 93–94 (describing competencecompetence as primarily “timing mechanism”). In American law, however, the two often
go together: If the parties agreed in their contract to let the arbitrator decide a certain
question of arbitrability, then the arbitrator decides first and will get deference. Cf. First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (“Did the parties agree to submit
the arbitrability question itself to arbitration? If so, then the court’s standard for reviewing
the arbitrator’s decision about that matter should not differ from the standard courts apply
when they review any other matter that parties have agreed to arbitrate. That is to say, the
court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision
only in certain narrow circumstances.” (internal citations omitted)); Barceló, supra, at
1133–34 (noting that in certain respects arbitral decisions on arbitrability may receive more
deference under American law than they would under French version of competencecompetence, which would call for de novo review). The courts that are creating the nascent trend toward greater arbitral authority rarely tell us whether, in sending the unconscionability challenge to the arbitrator, they mean option 1 or option 2 above; one suspects
they often overlook the distinction. But cf. Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., 346
F.3d 1024, 1033 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting and reserving question of judicial review of
arbitrator’s ruling on validity of remedial limitation that court was sending to arbitration).
For our purposes, the difference between option 1 and option 2 is not critical; the point is
that both of them represent a substantial departure from the practice of vesting authority
in the court to decide the matter conclusively before arbitration. For many litigants
seeking to avoid arbitration, the difference between option 1 and option 2 is irrelevant
because they do not intend to go through with an arbitration; a deferred court decision is
equivalent to none at all. Cf. Barceló, supra, at 1123 (discussing importance of timing of
judicial review).
213 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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Paint’s doctrine of separability is a rule of substantive federal law that
applies in state courts as well as in federal courts.214 The Court then
concluded that it was of no moment that the contract was deemed, as
a matter of state law, void ab initio (as opposed to merely voidable).215 The Florida courts, like some other courts, had thought this
state law distinction the key to whether Prima Paint applied.216 The
Supreme Court’s decision to send the matter to arbitration is quite
strange to many people, inasmuch as it finds a valid agreement to arbitrate in a null and criminal contract.217 But regardless of what one
thinks of the outcome, the important point for our purposes is that the
Buckeye rule makes these types of cases easy for a federal court to
decide in the sense that they only require the application of the federal rule of separability. No foray into state law distinctions between
voidness, voidability, and other categories is required, for such distinctions are henceforth irrelevant. This is an allocation rule that greatly
facilitates federal monitoring of the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.218
Keeping with the theme of allocation rules and moving closer to
unconscionability issues, the Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle 219 provides a good illustration of the odd turns that
the jurisprudence is taking. Bazzle implicated potentially far-reaching
questions regarding whether the FAA prohibits a court from ordering
class arbitration. Bars on class proceedings in arbitration are, of
course, frequent sources of unconscionability challenges.220 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina had held, applying state contract
law, that a particular arbitration agreement was silent regarding
214

Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 446.
216 See Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 863–64 (Fla. 2005)
(distinguishing Prima Paint on ground that contract was void), rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 (2006);
accord Ala. Catalog Sales v. Harris, 794 So. 2d 312, 314–17 (Ala. 2000) (same); Onvoy, Inc.
v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 353–54 (Minn. 2003) (same).
217 See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Prima Paint Pushed Compulsory Arbitration under the
Erie Train, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 1–4 (2007) (arguing that Buckeye makes
no sense according to normal common law contract doctrines).
218 As counsel for Buckeye put it at oral argument:
[W]hether something is void or voidable under State law, which may vary from
State to State, kind of misses the whole point which is the genius of a Federal
separability rule is we don’t care about those State law issues. You don’t have
to get into that bog to decide the arbitrability question . . . [;] you cannot avoid
arbitration by simply coming up with all those grounds.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440 (No. 04-1264),
2005 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 69.
219 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
220 See cases cited supra note 73.
215

1476

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1420

whether class arbitration was permitted and that, in such a circumstance, class arbitration was allowed.221
In such a scenario, there are several ways the U.S. Supreme
Court might reverse the state court, including (1) ruling that the state
court was simply wrong in interpreting the contract under state contract law to permit class arbitration in this case; (2) holding that the
interpretation of the contract’s stance toward class arbitration is a
matter of federal law and that, as a matter of this federal contract law,
the contract did not allow class arbitration; or (3) holding, as a matter
of federal law, that the interpretive question regarding the availability
of arbitration is a matter for the arbitrator rather than a court to
decide.
Option 1 should not be much of a contender, because it is usually
not the Supreme Court’s business to review state court rulings on state
contract law. Option 2 at least would be a proper ground for decision,
but it would be a very problematic ruling. After all, while the FAA
does create some federal substantive law, the Court had previously
stated that arbitration agreements are generally construed according
to ordinary state law contract rules.222 It would be quite stunning to
hold that all arbitration agreements are to be interpreted according to
a general federal common law instead of state law. Yet Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Bazzle, echoing his Bush v. Gore
concurrence, came very close to such a rule in stating that the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s ruling allowing class arbitration was so
wrong as a matter of contract interpretation that it was implicitly preempted by federal law.223
Thus Option 3—shifting the decision to the arbitrator—begins to
look attractive. Or at least it would if the parties had argued it: In
Bazzle, petitioner Green Tree did not contend that the question was
221

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447–50 (plurality opinion).
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
475 (1989) (stating that federal courts “apply[ ] general state-law principles of contract
interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the
[FAA]”). To be clear, the cases also recognize that certain federal interpretative presumptions apply, such as a presumption that the scope of an arbitration agreement should be
broadly construed in favor of arbitration. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944–45; Volt, 489 U.S.
at 475–76.
223 539 U.S. at 458–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). As Stephen Huber aptly observes: “The position taken by the Chief Justice is
puzzling. His approach, if adopted, would amount to nothing less than a federal common
law of arbitration contract interpretation.” Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About Class
Arbitration, 7 J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 2, 6 (2003).
222
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for the arbitrator but instead argued that the state court had violated
the FAA by failing to enforce the contract as written (i.e., in Green
Tree’s view, as forbidding class arbitration).224 Nonetheless, the
Bazzle plurality took this third approach.225
Even apart from the procedural oddity of disposing of the case on
grounds not requested by the parties, the Bazzle decision is most
curious. The plurality opinion expressly states that the question
whether class proceedings are permitted under the contract is a question of state law contract interpretation, and thus it declines to reverse
the state court’s interpretation on the merits.226 Yet in the next breath
the plurality proceeds to interpret the contract as regards its provisions for who decides whether class proceedings are allowed, concluding that the South Carolina court had erred in ruling upon that
question.227 The Court observed that the parties’ arbitration clause
was broad, conferring authority on the arbitrator to decide “all disputes . . . relating to this contract,” and that this was not the sort of
dispute the parties would assume a court would decide.228 Thus, the
decision is for the arbitrator. This allocation ruling, though a matter
of contract interpretation, is presented as what looks like a federal law
ruling: The Court cited federal cases,229 and, after all, it had just
stated that it would be improper to review the state law contract interpretation issue of whether class arbitration is actually allowed. In
sum, the question whether class arbitration is permitted is one of state
law because it is a matter of contract interpretation, but the question
of who decides whether class arbitration is permitted is, somehow,
apparently one of federal law, even though it is also a matter of contract interpretation.230
224 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part) (noting that Green Tree “has merely challenged the merits of [the state court] decision without claiming that it was made by the wrong decisionmaker”); Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634), 2003 WL 721716.
225 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451–54 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he question—whether the
agreement forbids class arbitration—is for the arbitrator to decide.”).
226 Id. at 447 (stating that whether “the contracts [are] in fact silent, or [whether] they
forbid class arbitration . . . is a matter of state law”); id. at 450 (explaining that Chief
Justice’s dissent would “ignore the fact that state law, not federal law, normally governs”
contract interpretation).
227 Id. at 451–53.
228 Id. at 451.
229 This result was foreshadowed in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., which discussed the “who decides” question while citing only federal cases and not state cases. 537
U.S. 79, 82–85 (2002). On the other side is First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, which
stated that “[w]hen deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter
(including arbitrability), courts generally . . . apply ordinary state-law principles.” 514 U.S.
938, 944 (1995).
230 As Prof. Monaghan describes the puzzle:
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The Court produced a similar result in another case decided
shortly before Bazzle. That case, PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v.
Book,231 raised potentially sweeping questions such as the enforceability of an arbitration clause that bars the arbitrator from awarding
damages otherwise available under a federal statute. The federal
statute at issue, RICO, allows awards of treble damages, but the arbitration clauses at issue barred awards of “punitive” damages.232 The
courts below found the arbitration clause unenforceable with regard
to the RICO claims due to the limitation on damages.233 The
Supreme Court did not decide whether such a limitation made the
arbitration agreement unenforceable or even whether the question of
the validity of the limitations was for the court or the arbitrator in the
first instance, deeming those inquiries “premature.”234 They were
premature because, according to the Supreme Court, the courts below
had wrongly assumed that a bar on punitive damages equated to a bar
on RICO treble damages, which are not exactly punitive (though not
exactly compensatory either).235 That is, there was initially a question
of contract interpretation regarding what the contracts purported to
bar. And that question should first be answered by the arbitrator, the
Court said, so the motion to compel arbitration should have been
granted.236 This decision that the initial interpretation of the limitation was for the arbitrator was itself evidently understood as a question of federal law—no state contract principles were mentioned.
It is true that the cases above do not directly address unconscionability and who—court or arbitrator—would decide a claim that an
arbitration clause was unconscionable because of a remedial limitation or some other feature. Both Bazzle and PacifiCare did, however,
address issues—class proceedings and punitive damages—that frequently arise in unconscionability cases. Both shifted difficult questions to the arbitrator rather than confront them head on, and they did
so as a matter of federal law. I do not claim to be able to prove that
the Supreme Court rendered these decisions because it believed that
Whether the state court correctly determined an allocation issue (i.e., who
decides, court or arbitrator) is an issue of state contract law only, and one that
is not antecedent to any federal claim, and thus, standard application of the
adequate nonfederal ground doctrine should have barred review. Or is the
Court implicitly “federalizing” arbitration law, at least in terms of allocation of
roles between courts and arbitrators?
Monaghan, supra note 70, at 1956. The answer to his query, surprisingly, seems to be yes.
231 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
232 Id. at 403.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 403–04.
235 Id. at 405–06.
236 Id. at 407.
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channeling decisional authority to the arbitrator was the way to hold
back a growing torrent of anti-arbitration rulings—though business
groups certainly made the Court aware of the unconscionability “epidemic” in their amicus filings.237 It does seem, however, that while
the rulings are strange in certain ways, they are consistent with the
type of approach that a court might take if it were acting strategically.
The lower federal courts, which lack discretionary control over
their dockets, have had to address the unconscionability problem
more directly and more frequently, and so we can look to them for
more development of this trend.
2. Developments in the Lower Federal Courts
While there is uncertainty and divergence of opinion on various
issues, a review of lower federal court decisions reveals the outlines of
a move toward courts putting greater emphasis on questions of allocation and toward federalizing this allocation question so that state
courts’ views on the unconscionability question become irrelevant.
A good illustration is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Anders v.
Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc. 238 By way of background, the
Alabama Supreme Court had recently decided cases in which it held
that a contractual bar on an arbitrator awarding punitive damages was
unconscionable and unenforceable. However, since the unconscionable limitation was severable from the rest of the agreement as a
matter of state contract doctrine, the Alabama court ordered arbitration minus the bar on punitive damages.239 The Eleventh Circuit in
Anders likewise faced the question of whether such a remedial limitation was permissible under Alabama law. Yet the court did not rule
on the question. It instead held that, since the restriction would be
severable if invalid, the arbitrator should rule on its validity:
Whether the agreement is valid as written or suffers [from] invalid
provisions that must be removed under the forgiving eye of the severance clause, there is a valid agreement to arbitrate in place. Since
237 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02634), 2002 WL 32101083 (“The court below suggested that it might reject an arbitration
agreement containing [a bar on class proceedings] as unconscionable. Some other courts
have already done so. Their hostility to arbitration could hardly be more clear.” (internal
citation omitted)); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5 n.2, Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634), 2003 WL
721691 (“Recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that class action bans in standard form
arbitration agreements are ‘manifestly one-sided’ by their very nature and hence are inherently unconscionable. The present case is an appropriate vehicle for dispatching that shibboleth.” (internal citation omitted)).
238 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003).
239 E.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 730–34 (Ala. 2002).
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the case is going to arbitration, an arbitrator and not a court should
decide the validity of the remedial restriction provisions . . . .240

This holding was in some tension with an older Eleventh Circuit
case, which—like most older cases—had ruled upon the validity of an
arbitration clause containing a damages restriction.241 Anders gave
the earlier case a very narrow reading, deeming the case irrelevant
because it had not discussed whether the contract contained a severability clause.242 Anders also had to address an apparent conflict with
the Alabama state cases:
We realize that the Supreme Court of Alabama [in its recent cases]
did decide the validity of the challenged remedial restrictions in
those cases before sending the disputes to arbitration. If it were a
matter of general contract law, we would follow [that] approach
here, because Alabama law applies to the general contract questions in this case. However, unlike severability, whether a court or
arbitrator is to decide particular issues is not a question of contract
law, but is instead governed by the FAA; it is a federal law issue
. . . . State and federal courts are free to decide federal law issues
for themselves (unless and until the United States Supreme Court
settles the matter). We have done so, concluding that the arbitrator
should decide whether the remedial provisions of the arbitration
agreement are invalid, if the arbitrator decides that Anders’ claims
have merit.243

In sum, the Alabama Supreme Court’s unconscionability holding
may have been right, but the state court should not have asked the
question in the first place. Parties should instead go to arbitration and
present this challenge there. Some other recent cases have likewise
held that various unconscionability challenges should also be decided
by an arbitrator.244 Again, the point is not that these decisions are
wrong. The point is that they depart significantly from what most
courts thought was the law,245 and this change in the law may reflect a
240

Anders, 346 F.3d at 1032.
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998).
242 Anders, 346 F.3d at 1031. Perhaps the contract did not have one, but the Paladino
court’s failure to mention it one way or the other just as plausibly suggests that the earlier
panel did not think it relevant.
243 Id. at 1033.
244 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that validity of remedial limitations and ban on class arbitration should be
decided by arbitrator); Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 334 F.3d 721,
726–27 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged unconscionability of attorneys’ fees provisions
was question for arbitrator); see also In re Am. Express Merchants Litig., No. 03-CV09592, 2006 WL 662341, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) (holding that “enforceability of the
collective action waivers is a claim for the arbitrator to resolve” when waivers were alleged
to violate antitrust laws).
245 See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text (discussing case law on this point).
241
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perceived need to take decisionmaking power away from the state
courts (and some federal courts).
We can close this Section with one more instance of innovation in
federalization and allocation rules. The difference is that this one
seems sufficiently wrong that it is difficult not to suspect that the
motive was to cut anti-arbitration state courts out of the loop. This
case, perhaps surprisingly, comes from the Ninth Circuit, which is in
many ways the circuit most hospitable to state unconscionability rulings. California, like many states, typically requires that an agreement
display some degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability before it will be invalidated.246 Arguments regarding the substantive unconscionability of an arbitration clause will generally target
certain aspects of the clause, such as its provisions concerning remedies, expenses, or forum. Arguments concerning procedural unconscionability, though proffered for the purpose of invalidating the
substantively burdensome arbitration clause, will generally include
matters such as adhesionary formation and unequal bargaining power
that apply to the formation of the contract as a whole. In other words,
one has to make some arguments that apply to the circumstances of
the formation of the contract as a whole, even though the target is just
the arbitration clause. This type of inquiry was not thought to conflict
with Prima Paint’s admonition that the court can consider only challenges that implicate the validity of the arbitration clause. Indeed,
since an unconscionability analysis will almost always include some
matters that involve the contract as a whole—namely its adhesionary
formation—such a reading of Prima Paint would mean that practically
all of the many courts to have ruled on unconscionability had overstepped their jurisdiction. That could not possibly be correct.
Or could it? In Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., a Ninth Circuit
panel came to the startling latter-day conclusion that it and other
courts had been ignoring Prima Paint all along without even knowing
it.247 The franchisee plaintiff sought to invalidate an arbitration clause
in a franchise agreement she had signed, claiming that it was unconscionable—both procedurally and substantively, as California law
requires.248 As often happens, her procedural unconscionability argument included both allegations that applied to the arbitration clause in
particular (namely, that she lacked notice and the clause was incon246 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689–90 (Cal. 2000).
They need not be present in equal degree; the presence of more of one type means that less
of the other type is required. Id. See generally WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 81, § 18:10
(discussing substantive and procedural unconscionability).
247 401 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d en banc, 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006).
248 Id. at 1027.
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spicuous) and a general charge that the entire contract was adhesionary.249 The panel, which could reasonably be regarded as probusiness, found the clause-specific charges insufficient to constitute
procedural unconscionability and then refused to consider the more
general adhesion arguments, holding that Prima Paint prohibited the
inquiry.250 It therefore did not even reach the substantive attack on
the arbitration clause—that it provided for expensive arbitration on
the other side of the country—because the plaintiff had not been able
to establish procedural unconscionability.251 The panel was
untroubled by the apparent conflict with prior Ninth Circuit decisions,
explaining that those decisions had not discussed Prima Paint.252 The
prior cases’ failure to discuss Prima Paint would be unsurprising, of
course, if Prima Paint is not implicated.
Although the Nagrampa panel decision was later repudiated by
an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit,253 the episode nonetheless represents a striking approach to blocking an unconscionability challenge.
California substantive law is regarded as hostile to arbitration, and its
courts are often more than willing to declare arbitration agreements
unconscionable. Rather than directly challenge the state law as discriminatory, the Nagrampa panel instead wholly circumvented the
state unconscionability inquiry by cutting courts out of the picture.
The panel’s allocation ruling that the unconscionability inquiry is for
the arbitrator would have been a rule of substantive federal law applicable in state courts as well as federal courts,254 and thus sought to
take away the California courts’ favorite tool for invalidating arbitration clauses.
There is good reason to think that the court’s views on the “who
decides” question were driven not so much by a disagreement over
Prima Paint but rather reflected deeper views about arbitration and
249

Id. at 1027–30.
Id. at 1027–28. The opinion was authored by Circuit Judge O’Scannlain (appointed
by President Reagan), joined by Circuit Judge Bea (appointed by President G.W. Bush)
and Senior Circuit Judge Cowan (of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation, appointed by
President Reagan). Judges’ biographical information is available at the Federal Judicial
Center’s website, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj.
251 Nagrampa, 401 F.3d at 1030.
252 Id. at 1028 (citing Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001), as
prior case that had not considered Prima Paint problem).
253 Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), rev’g
401 F.3d 1024 (explaining that court must consider challenge to arbitration agreement even
when “substantive state law requires the court to consider, in the course of analyzing the
validity of the arbitration provision, the circumstances surrounding the making of the
entire agreement”).
254 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447–48 (2006) (holding
that separability doctrine governs in state courts).
250
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unconscionability. Of the thirteen circuit judges who examined the
case, all but one took a consistent view, either pro-arbitration or antiarbitration, both on the “who decides” question and on the merits of
the unconscionability challenge. That is, the judges believed either
that (1) the question was for the court and the clause was unconscionable, or (2) the question was for the arbitrator and, in any event, the
clause was not unconscionable.255
3. Expanding Federal Jurisdiction?
When the state courts produce outcomes that are regarded as
deficient, one response is to create federal law that will displace or
counteract a disfavored aspect of state law. As we have seen, arbitration doctrine continues to become more federal in character. Our
modern judicial system, however, is predicated on the idea that the
identity of the forum holds its own independent significance.256 Thus,
while state courts routinely apply federal law, either plaintiff or defendant may instead choose the federal forum for their federal dispute.257
In diversity cases, federal courts today apply state substantive law, and
so diversity jurisdiction is now defended (to the extent it is defended)
in part because the difference in forum might lead to a difference in
result despite application of the same substantive rules.258
Given the perception that some state courts are insufficiently
attentive to the national policy favoring arbitration, it should not be
surprising to see pressure developing on the jurisdictional front. To
the extent that anti-arbitration rulings are most common in state
courts, an expansion of federal adjudicative jurisdiction would
represent an attractive pro-arbitration response, even if both court
systems are supposed to apply the same mix of federal and state
law.259
255 Only Judge Clifton reached a split decision, finding that the question was for the
court but that the clause was valid. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1294 (Clifton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Three judges were on the original panel and eleven were on
the en banc panel, with one overlap between the two (Judge O’Scannlain), thus totaling
thirteen circuit judges.
256 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2004) (“Commentators
and courts understand that often [a state or federal interest] is at stake in the adjudication
of a case, [which] calls out for litigation in one court system or another.”).
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (conferring federal jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal law); id. § 1441 (conferring removal jurisdiction).
258 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1498–1500 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing post-Erie
justifications for diversity jurisdiction).
259 A somewhat similar dynamic was at work when Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA). Congress believed that expanding federal jurisdiction would reduce
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To begin by clarifying the existing jurisdictional landscape:
Although the FAA creates substantive federal law requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements, “it does not create any independent
federal-question jurisdiction.”260 Thus, the fact that one contracting
party is flouting its (federal) duty to arbitrate does not all by itself
permit an aggrieved party to file a federal action seeking to compel
arbitration. There must be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond just the arbitration agreement.261 That much is clear and
seems unlikely to change anytime soon.
Around the edges of the jurisdictional rules, however, there is
room for pro-arbitration federal courts to shift more cases away from
the state courts. To pick one example, suppose that two parties are
engaged in a dispute: One contends that the matter must be arbitrated, but the other refuses. If the parties are diverse and the requisite amount of money is at stake, the district court will have diversity
jurisdiction to entertain a petition by one party seeking to compel the
other to arbitrate.262 But what if, in the absence of diversity, the party
seeking to compel arbitration tries instead to invoke federal question
jurisdiction—not based solely on the FAA, but based on the fact that
the underlying dispute, which the other party refuses to arbitrate,
arises under federal law (say, under federal securities law)? Would
the federal character of the underlying dispute support federal question jurisdiction?
The older view tended to be that the federal nature of the underlying dispute did not suffice to confer federal jurisdiction over an
action to compel arbitration.263 At one point this position seemed on

“abusive” choice-of-law decisions, even though federal courts follow state choice-of-law
rules. Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1723–26 (2006); accord S. Rep. No. 108-123, at 61 (2003) (“A premise
of the Class Action Fairness Act is that [the problem of abusive choice-of-law decisions]
can be corrected by expanding federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions, the theory
being that federal courts will not engage in ‘false federalism’ games.”). Of course, another
motive for CAFA was to change the governing procedural law by substituting Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 and its associated jurisprudence for state class-certification law,
which was in some places more favorable to certification. Nagareda, supra note 94, at
1912–13.
260 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
261 Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006) (providing for stays of litigation and orders compelling arbitration in cases within district courts’ preexisting jurisdiction).
262 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 121, § 3569 (2d ed. 1984).
263 E.g., Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 1997); Westmoreland
Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 266–68 (2d Cir. 1996); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v.
Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 989 (5th Cir. 1992); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock,
696 F. Supp. 957, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Leval, J.).
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its way to becoming settled doctrine.264 Then, in 1999, the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed in a footnote that did not cite any of the prior cases
to the contrary.265 In 2001, the Fifth Circuit, in apparent sub silentio
conflict with one of its earlier decisions, likewise applied the lookthrough-to-the-underlying-dispute approach.266 In 2005, the Fourth
Circuit also embraced the broad view of federal jurisdiction in a
careful opinion by Judge Wilkinson. The opinion relied primarily on
textual arguments, but the court also pointed out that the broader
view would promote the federal policy in favor of enforcement of
arbitration agreements.267 A pro-arbitration shift seemed to be
underway.
The Supreme Court might soon rule upon whether the underlying
federal character of a dispute can confer jurisdiction.268 As with the
debate over the allocation rule dividing authority between courts and
arbitrators, our concern is not to attempt to discern the correct answer
but instead to examine the strategic dynamics at work. The broader
view of federal jurisdiction is clearly the more pro-arbitration view.
Imagine an employer engaged in a dispute with an employee implicating federal antidiscrimination law. If the parties are in a state
264 See Minor v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting “strong
body of caselaw” in support of this view).
265 Tamiami Partners, Ltd. ex rel. Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
177 F.3d 1212, 1223 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999).
266 Compare Rio Grande Underwriters, Inc. v. Pitts Farms, Inc., 276 F.3d 683, 685 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“A party may obtain relief in federal court under the FAA only when the
underlying civil action would otherwise be subject to the court’s federal question or diversity jurisdiction.”), with Prudential-Bache, 966 F.2d at 989 (“Federal jurisdiction did not
vest over this action based on the federal character of the underlying claims . . . .”).
267 Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir. 2005). Although it adopted the
broad view of jurisdiction, the court remanded to the district court to determine whether
the underlying dispute really did arise under federal law. Id. at 373.
Academic commentary tends to favor the broad view of federal jurisdiction. For
scholarship reviewing the issue and supporting the broad view, see generally MACNEIL ET
AL., supra note 29, § 9.2.3, Richard A. Bales & Jamie Ireland, Federal Question Jurisdiction
and the Federal Arbitration Act, 80 COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1112304, and Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319 (2007).
268 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in a subsequent appeal in the Vaden litigation.
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1651 (2008).
The case presents the jurisdictional question in a rather awkward situation. Discover Bank
initiated litigation in state court. When its customer countersued with class action claims
purportedly based on state law, Discover Bank filed an independent federal court action
seeking to compel arbitration of the counterclaims, which it contended were completely
preempted by federal banking law. Id. at 597–98. It is certainly possible that the Supreme
Court could hold that it is proper to look through to the underlying dispute in some cases
but not in this peculiar type of case, in which Discover Bank arguably tried to circumvent
the rule that federal counterclaims do not support removal. See Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–32 (2002) (holding that counterclaim
does not satisfy “arising under” jurisdictional test).
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whose courts are relatively unsympathetic to arbitration of employment disputes, it is easy to see why the employer would like access to
federal court, even though the federal court should in theory apply the
same state unconscionability doctrine as would the state court.
Indeed, supporters of the broad view of federal jurisdiction write that
one consideration in support of their view is that it allows parties
seeking arbitration, especially of federal statutory claims, to escape
from state courts that are perceived as less friendly toward arbitration.269 Adopting the broad view of district court jurisdiction would
relieve to some degree the Supreme Court’s current burden of
reviewing state court arbitration rulings, setting up the lower federal
courts in its place.270
The important point here is that this or other questions about the
jurisdictional reach of the FAA are not solely technical debates over
how to read a statute but are also disputes that have a distinctly political, and potentially strategic, valence.
D. Congress: Coming off the Sidelines?
Congress has long left the FAA in the courts’ hands to develop in
a common law fashion, but Congress is always free to amend the
statute. Indeed, in some ways the issue screams out for a legislative
solution, as the current state of the law leaves almost nobody happy:
Pro-arbitration forces decry the rise of unconscionability analysis,
while consumer activists and employee advocates find unconscionability an unsatisfactory defense against the spread of arbitration. And
regardless of one’s position on those policy questions, the current doctrine is problematic from the point of view of rule-of-law values like
stability and hierarchical compliance. Let us therefore close by considering Congress’s part in the unconscionability game.
269

Szalai, supra note 267, at 323 & n.15.
Cf. Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 253–54 (1988)
(explaining that mid-twentieth-century habeas decisions deployed federal district courts as
Supreme Court’s surrogates in reviewing state convictions). But cf. BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 613 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court will work at this
business [of monitoring punitive damages] alone. It will not be aided by the federal district
courts and courts of appeals. It will be the only federal court policing the area.”). To be
clear, adopting the broader view of FAA jurisdiction would make a difference in only
certain categories of cases. If the party resisting arbitration actually filed suit in state court
asserting the federal claim, that suit would ordinarily be removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(2006). If the party resisting arbitration filed suit in federal court asserting the federal
claim, the court would not need any additional jurisdictional basis to entertain the defendant’s request to compel arbitration. Prudential-Bache, 966 F.2d at 989. The broader view
of federal jurisdiction really does increase access to the federal courts in certain scenarios,
however, such as when no suit has yet been filed or when the supposedly arbitrable federal
claim arises as a state court counterclaim.
270
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Congress has not yet played an active role, either to restrict the
reach of arbitration or to further limit defenses to arbitration. Not for
lack of proposals: Scores of bills and proposals have been advanced in
recent years,271 and yet no major legislation affecting the topics at
issue here has passed.272 The November 2006 election, which brought
the Democrats to power in both houses of Congress, has given new
prominence to proposals to remove mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements from the consumer economy and workplace. Potentially
the most significant development is the introduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would exempt consumer, employment,
franchise, and civil rights disputes from the FAA’s purview, as well as
specifying that courts, rather than arbitrators, should rule on challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements.273 The bill faces stiff
resistance from powerful interest groups and has not yet emerged
from committee.274
Nonetheless, even if Congress takes no action, its mere presence
could affect how other players behave. Just as inferior courts shape
their behavior with an eye toward the anticipated responses of superior courts, the Supreme Court might shape its behavior with an eye
toward the anticipated responses of the actor able to override its arbi271 See, e.g., S. Pierre Paret, Report from Washington: Looking Back: ADR Legislation
in the 109th Congress, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29591 (reporting that
over sixty ADR-related bills were introduced in 2005–2006).
272 There have been a few narrowly focused enactments, such as a 2002 statute that
makes predispute arbitration agreements in certain automobile franchise arrangements
voidable, 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, § 11028(a)(2), 116 Stat. 1758, 1836 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)
(2006)), a 2006 statute exempting members of the military and their dependents from arbitrating consumer credit disputes, John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, sec. 670(a), § 987(f)(4), 120 Stat. 2083, 2267–68
(2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006)), and a 2008 enactment that restricts the
use of arbitration clauses in livestock and poultry production contracts, Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, sec. 11005, § 210, 122 Stat. 923, 1357–58
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c).
273 S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). A recent law review
symposium was devoted to the topic of amending the FAA. Symposium, Rethinking the
Federal Arbitration Act: An Examination of Whether and How the Statute Should Be
Amended, 8 NEV. L.J. 1 (2007).
274 See Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen
Specter, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docId=1082 (urging opposition to Arbitration Fairness Act); Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President of Gov’t Affairs,
Chamber of Commerce, to Representatives Linda T. Sanchez and Chris Cannon, House
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docId=1077 (same). Information on the
status of the bills is available through the Thomas website operated by the Library of
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/.

1488

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1420

tration decisions, Congress.275 The Supreme Court has been less
aggressive in combating unconscionability rulings than one might
expect, given its strongly pro-arbitration preferences. As suggested
above, the difficulty of review is likely a good part of the explanation
for why the Court, despite its aggressive moves on other fronts, has
been hesitant. But sophisticated Justices might also refrain from
attacking unconscionability rulings if they believed that doing so
would provoke Congress to amend the FAA in a way that would harm
the Court’s long-term pro-arbitration preferences.
Unconscionability might operate as a sort of safety valve that
makes arbitration politically sustainable. It permits courts, on a caseby-case basis, to respond to the most compelling inequities. At the
same time, the mere risk of an unconscionability challenge may prevent drafters of arbitration clauses from overreaching. In this way,
unconscionability is an outlet to relieve pressure on the system and
avert the truly intolerable outcomes that might provoke legislative
action. To the extent that the recent Democratic majorities in
Congress make legislative action to restrict arbitration more likely
(which is not necessarily to say likely in absolute terms), a sophisticated Supreme Court would tend to be careful about closing off this
safety valve.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to explain recent and ongoing developments in FAA case law as the result of a strategic interaction
between various courts with divergent preferences regarding arbitration. As the Supreme Court has shut off various means of resisting
arbitration, unconscionability has become one of the few tools still
available to skeptical courts. The flexibility of unconscionability doctrine, however, creates the potential for the conflicting judicial preferences to express themselves through manipulation of state law. This
noncompliance then drives further responses by pro-arbitration courts
275 There is a significant and growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, on
whether the Supreme Court decides its statutory interpretation cases with an eye toward
the possibility of congressional override. E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 99, at 103–10,
326–55; Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50
EMORY L.J. 583, 591–95 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A
Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the
State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1631, 1652–56 (1995). Needless to say, my brief remarks are not intended to settle
that debate but instead simply address how Congress might play a role in the unconscionability game and how that might influence a strategic Supreme Court.
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like the Supreme Court, including development of new doctrines and
allocation rules that ease monitoring.
One might wish, by way of conclusion, to declare who is “winning” or to predict who will “win” the unconscionability game, but
this is difficult. Recall the chart in Part I.C, above, which shows that
the sharp upward trend in unconscionability challenges to arbitration
agreements might have started to level off. It is risky to draw conclusions from those data, but one could propose a few potential explanations. One possibility is that many of the issues regarding
unconscionability have now been resolved one way or the other, so
that there is less need for litigation. That is, the doctrine has simply
become more mature. Another possibility is that unconscionability
challenges have leveled off because the most aggressive arbitration
clauses have been eliminated.276 The cases have told companies how
far they can go, and the companies have redrafted their clauses to
push right up to the edge. That would be a victory of sorts for courts
resistant to arbitration, though a victory only at the margins of the
continuing triumph of mandatory arbitration. Still another possibility
is that the nascent allocation rule pushed by pro-arbitration courts and
described in Part III.C is beginning to work: Courts are starting to
have fewer opportunities to rule on unconscionability arguments,
because the authority has been shifted to the arbitrator. Time will tell,
and the game will continue to evolve, with each side countering the
other side’s latest innovation. And just possibly, Congress will radically restructure the game. Legislation exempting consumer and
employment disputes from arbitration would do much to eliminate the
tensions that generate the unconscionability game, as there is little
opposition today to arbitration between sophisticated commercial
parties.
Turning to broader themes, the FAA has much to teach federal
courts scholars because it is a curious amalgam of federal and state
law—a federal duty of fidelity to general state law—that seems to
invite trouble. It also shows us that topics such as civil rights and
criminal defendants’ rights are not the only areas in which we should
be attuned to the possibility of evasion of federal mandates.
But my aims in this Article go beyond the FAA in particular.
Part of the attraction of the political scientists’ strategic approaches to
judicial behavior is that they can accommodate sophisticated understandings of doctrine. Even if judges are partly motivated by ideology, that does not render doctrine unimportant; indeed, doctrine
can operate as an important tool. I have hoped to provide an illustra276

See supra note 141 (describing this possibility).
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tion and contextualized elaboration of such a model of judicial
behavior, in which emerging doctrinal changes reflect not just legal
considerations, nor just preferences, but rather respond to the ongoing
problem of monitoring lower courts. I believe there are many further
insights that future work at this intersection of law and political science can generate.

